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Abstract. We present a coherence-based probability semantics for (categorical)
Aristotelian syllogisms. For framing the Aristotelian syllogisms as probabilistic inferences,
we interpret basic syllogistic sentence types A, E, I, O by suitable precise and imprecise
conditional probability assessments. Then, we define validity of probabilistic inferences
and probabilistic notions of the existential import which is required, for the validity of the
syllogisms. Based on a generalization of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem to conditional
probability, we investigate the coherent probability propagation rules of argument forms
of the syllogistic Figures I, II, and III, respectively. These results allow to show, for all
three Figures, that each traditionally valid syllogism is also valid in our coherence-based
probability semantics. Moreover, we interpret the basic syllogistic sentence types by
suitable defaults and negated defaults. Thereby, we build a knowledge bridge from our
probability semantics of Aristotelian syllogisms to nonmonotonic reasoning. Finally, we
show how the proposed semantics can be used to analyze syllogisms involving generalized
quantifiers.
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§1. Motivation and Outline. There is a long tradition in logic to investigate
categorical syllogisms that goes back to Aristotle’s Analytica Priora. However,
not many authors proposed probability semantics for categorical syllogisms (see,
e.g., Amarger et al., 1991; Boole, 1854; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Cohen, 1999;
De Morgan, 1847; Dubois et al., 1993; Hailperin, 1996; Gilio et al., 2016; Lambert,
1764; Thierry, 2011) to overcome formal restrictions imposed by logic, like its
monotonicity (i.e., the inability to retract conclusions in the light of new evidence)
or its qualitative nature (i.e., the inability to express degrees of belief ). In
particular, universally and existentially quantified statements are hardly ever used
in commonsense contexts: even if people mention words like “all” or “every”, they
usually don’t mean all in the modern sense of the universal quantifier @. Indeed,
universal quantified statements are usually not falsified by one exception in everyday
life. Likewise, people mostly don’t mean by “some” at least one in the sense of the
existential quantifier D. Our aim is to provide a richer and more flexible framework
for managing quantified statements in common sense reasoning. Specifically, our
probabilistic approach is scalable in the sense that the proposed semantics allows
for managing not only traditional logical quantifiers but also the much bigger
superset of generalized quantifiers. Such a framework will also be useful as a
rationality framework for the psychology of reasoning, which has a long tradition in
investigating syllogisms (see, e.g., Sto¨rring, 1908; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012;
Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005). Finally, a further aim within our probabilistic approach is
to build a knowledge bridge from ancient syllogisms to relatively recent approaches
in nonmonotonic reasoning.
Among various approaches to probability, we use the subjective interpretation.
Specifically, we use the theory of subjective probability based on the coherence
principle of Bruno de Finetti (see, e.g., de Finetti, 1931, 1974). This coherence
principle has been investigated by many authors and it has been generalized to the
conditional probability and to imprecise probability (see, e.g., Berti et al., 1998;
Biazzo et al., 2005; Capotorti et al., 2003, 2007; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio,
1990, 1996; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013b; Gilio et al., 2016; Holzer, 1985; Lad, 1996;
Petturiti & Vantaggi, 2017; Regazzini, 1985; Walley et al., 2004). The coherence
principle plays a key role in probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, it allows us to
extend any coherent assessment, on an arbitrary family of (conditional) events,
to further (conditional) events (fundamental theorem of probability). Moreover,
coherence is a more general approach to conditional probabilities compared to
approaches which requires positive probability for the conditioning events. In
standard approaches to probability the conditional probability ppE|Hq is defined
by the ratio ppE^Hq{ppHq, which requires positive probability of the conditioning
event, ppHq ą 0. However, in the coherence-based approach, conditional probability
ppE|Hq is a primitive notion and it is properly defined even if the conditioning
event has probability zero, i.e., P pHq “ 0. Therefore, coherence is a more general
approach to conditional probabilities compared to approaches which requires
positive probability for the conditioning events. In the present context this aspect
will be important for analyzing the validity of the probabilistic syllogisms and for
investigating probabilistic existential import assumptions.
Traditional categorical syllogisms are valid argument forms consisting of two
premises and a conclusion, which are composed of basic syllogistic sentence types
(see, e.g., Pfeifer, 2006): Every a is b (A), No a is b (E), Some a is b (I), and Some
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Figure I (term order: M–P , S–M , therefore S–P )
AAA Barbara Every M is P, Every S is M, therefore Every S is P
AAI* Barbari Every M is P, Every S is M, therefore Some S is P
AII Darii Every M is P, Some S is M, therefore Some S is P
EAE Celarent No M is P, Every S is M, therefore No S is P
EAO*Celaront No M is P, Every S is M, therefore Some S is not P
EIO Ferio No M is P, Some S is M, therefore Some S is not P
Figure II (term order: P–M , S–M , therefore S–P )
AEE Camestres Every P is M, No S is M, therefore No S is P
AEO*Camestrop Every P is M, No S is M, therefore Some S is not P
AOO Baroco Every P is M, Some S is not M, therefore Some S is not P
EAE Cesare No P is M, Every S is M, therefore No S is P
EAO*Cesaro No P is M, Every S is M, therefore Some S is not P
EIO Festino Every P is M, Some S is M, therefore Some S is not P
Figure III (term order: M–P , M–S, therefore S–P )
AII Datisi Every M is P, Some M is S, therefore Some S is P
AAI* Darapti Every M is P, Every M is S, therefore Some S is P
EIO Ferison No M is P, Some M is S, therefore Some S is not P
EAO* Felapton No M is P, Every M is S, therefore Some S is not P
IAI Disamis Some M is P, Every M is S, therefore Some S is P
OAO Bocardo Some M is not P, Every M is S, therefore Some S is not P
Table 1: Traditional and logically valid Aristotelian syllogisms. * denotes syllogisms
with implicit existential import assumptions.
a is not b (O), where “a” and “b” denote two of the three categorical terms M
(“middle term”), P (“predicate term”), or S (“subject term”). As an example of
sentence type A consider Every man is mortal. The M term appears only in the
premises and is combined with P in the first premise (“major premise”) and S in the
second premise (“minor premise”). In the conclusion only the S term and the P term
appear, traditionally in the fixed order S–P . By all possible permutations of the
predicate order, four syllogistic figures result under the given restrictions. Following
Aristotle’s Analytica Priora, we will focus on the first three figures. Specifically, on
the traditionally valid Aristotelian syllogisms of Figure I, II, and III (see Table 1).
Consider (Modus) Barbara, which is a valid syllogism of Figure I: Every M is P ,
Every S is M , therefore Every S is P .
Note that some traditionally valid syllogisms require existential import
assumption for the validity. For example, Barbari (Every M is P , Every S is M ,
therefore Some S is P ) is valid under the assumption that the S term is not “empty”
(in the sense that there is some S). The names of the syllogisms traditionally encode
logical properties. For the present purpose, we only recall that vowels refer to the
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Type Sentence Probabilistic interpretation Equivalent interpretation
(A) Every S is P ppP |Sq “ 1 pp sP |Sq “ 0
(E) No S is P ppP |Sq “ 0 pp sP |Sq “ 1
(I) Some S is P ppP |Sq ą 0 pp sP |Sq ă 1
(O) Some S is not P pp sP |Sq ą 0 ppP |Sq ă 1
Table 2: Probabilistic interpretations of the basic syllogistic sentence types based
on P |S and sP |S.
syllogistic sentence type: for instance, Barbara involves three sentences of type A,
i.e., AAA (see, e.g., Pfeifer, 2006, for details).
In our approach we interpret the syllogistic terms as events. An event is conceived
as a bi-valued logical entity which can be true or false. Moreover, we associate
(ordered) pair of terms S–P with the corresponding conditional event P |S, that is
as a tri-valued logical object (Gilio et al., 2016).
For giving a probabilistic interpretation of the premises and the conclusions of
the syllogisms, we interpret basic syllogistic sentence types A, E, I, O by suitable
imprecise conditional probability assessments. Specifically, we interpret the degree
of belief in syllogistic sentence A by ppP |Sq “ 1, E by ppP |Sq “ 0, I by P pP |Sq ą 0,
and we interpret O by pp sP |Sq ą 0 (Table 2; see Chater & Oaksford, 1999;
Gilio et al., 2016). Thus, A and E are interpreted as precise probability assessments
and I and O by imprecise probability assessments. The basic logical relations among
this interpretation of the syllogistic sentence types are analyzed in the probabilistic
Square and in the probabilistic Hexagon of Opposition (Pfeifer & Sanfilippo,
2017a,b).
For framing the Aristotelian syllogisms as probabilistic inferences, we define
validity of probabilistic inferences. We recall that in classical logic some Aristotelian
syllogisms, like Barbari, require existential import assumptions for logical validity
(marked by * in Table 1). In the present approach we require probabilistic versions of
existential import assumptions for the validity of all traditionally valid syllogisms.
For example, we do not only require an existential import assumption for syllogisms
like Barbari but also for syllogisms like Barbara. Indeed, from the probabilistic
premises of Barbari and Barbara, i.e., ppP |Mq “ 1 and ppM |Sq “ 1, we cannot
validly infer the respective conclusion because only a non-informative conclusion
can be obtained, i.e., every value of ppP |Sq in r0, 1s is coherent. In order to validate
the conclusions of Barbari and Barbara, that is ppP |Sq ą 0 and ppP |Sq “ 1,
respectively, we add the probabilistic constraints ppS|pS_Mqq ą 0 as a probabilistic
existential import assumption.
Based on a generalization of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem to (precise and
imprecise) conditional probability, we study the coherent probability propagation
rules of argument forms of the syllogistic Figures I, II, and III. These results allow to
show, for all three Figures, that each traditionally valid syllogism is also valid in our
coherence-based probability semantics. Moreover, we build a knowledge bridge from
our probability semantics of Aristotelian syllogisms to nonmonotonic reasoning by
interpreting the basic syllogistic sentence types by suitable defaults (A: S |∼ P , E:
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S |∼ sP ) and negated defaults (I: S |∼{ sP , O: S |∼{ P ). We also show how the proposed
semantics can be used to analyze syllogisms involving generalized quantifiers (like
at least most S are P ).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section §2. we recall preliminary notions
and results on the coherence of conditional probability assessments and recall an
algorithm for coherent probability propagation. In Section §3. we define validity and
strict validity of probabilistic inferences and probabilistic notions of the existential
import, which is required for the validity of the syllogisms. In Sections §4., §5.,
and §6. we study the coherent probability propagation rules of argument forms
of the syllogistic Figures I, II, and III, respectively. Then, we show for all three
Figures that each traditionally valid syllogism is also valid in our coherence-
based probability semantics. In Section §7. we build a knowledge bridge from
our probability semantics of Aristotelian syllogisms to nonmonotonic reasoning by
interpreting the basic syllogistic sentence types by suitable defaults and negated
defaults. In Section §8. we show how the proposed semantics can be used to analyze
syllogisms involving generalized quantifiers. Section §9. concludes the paper by a
brief summary of the main results and by an outlook to future work.
§2. Preliminary Notions and Results on Coherence. In this section
we recall selected key features of coherence (for more details see, e.g.,
Biazzo & Gilio, 2000; Biazzo et al., 2012; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Coletti et al.,
2015; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a,b; Petturiti & Vantaggi, 2017; Sanfilippo et al.,
2018). Given two events E and H , with H ‰ K, the conditional event E|H
is defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true if EH (i.e., E ^ H) is
true, false if sEH is true, and void if H is false. In betting terms, assessing
ppE|Hq “ x means that, for every real number s, you are willing to pay an
amount s ¨ x and to receive s, or 0, or s ¨ x, according to whether EH is true,
or sEH is true, or sH is true (i.e., the bet is called off), respectively. In these cases
the random gain is G “ sHpE ´ xq. More generally speaking, consider a real-
valued function p : K Ñ R, where K is an arbitrary (possibly not finite) family
of conditional events. Let F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq be a sequence of conditional
events, where Ei|Hi P K, i “ 1, . . . , n, and let P “ pp1, . . . , pnq be the vector
of values pi “ ppEi|Hiq, where i “ 1, . . . , n. We denote by Hn the disjunction
H1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Hn. As EiHi _ sEiHi _ sHi “ Ω , i “ 1, . . . , n, by expanding the
expression
Źn
i“1pEiHi _
sEiHi _ sHiq, we can represent Ω as the disjunction of 3n
logical conjunctions, some of which may be impossible. The remaining ones are the
atoms, or constituents, generated by the family F and, of course, are a partition of
Ω. We denote by C1, . . . , Cm the constituents contained in Hn and (if Hn ‰ Ω) by
C0 the remaining constituent sHn “ sH1 ¨ ¨ ¨ sHn, so that
Hn “ C1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Cm , Ω “ sHn _Hn “ C0 _ C1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Cm , m` 1 ď 3n .
With the pair pF ,Pq we associate the random gain G “
řn
i“1 siHipEi´piq, where
s1, . . . , sn are n arbitrary real numbers. G represents the net gain of n transactions.
Let GHn denote the set of possible values of G restricted to Hn, that is, the values
of G when at least one conditioning event is true.
Definition 2.1. Function p defined on K is coherent if and only if, for every
integer n, for every sequence F of n conditional events in K and for every s1, . . . , sn,
it holds that: minGHn ď 0 ď maxGHn .
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Intuitively, Definition 2.1., means in betting terms that a probability assessment is
coherent if and only if, in any finite combination of n bets, it cannot happen that
the values in GHn are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch Book).
Given any integer n we set Jn “ t1, 2, . . . , nu; for each h P Jm with the constituent
Ch we associate a point Qh “ pqh1, . . . , qhnq, where qhj “ 1, or 0, or pj , according
to whether Ch Ď EjHj , or Ch Ď sEjHj , or Ch Ď sHj .
Denoting by I the convex hull of Q1, . . . , Qm, by a suitable alternative
theorem (Theorem 2.9 in Gale, 1960), the condition P P I is equivalent to the
condition minGHn ď 0 ď maxGHn given in Definition 2.1. (see, e.g., Gilio,
1996; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013b). Moreover, the condition P P I amounts to the
solvability of the following system pSq in the unknowns λ1, . . . , λm
pSq :
řm
h“1 qhjλh “ pj , j P Jn ;
řm
h“1 λh “ 1 ; λh ě 0 , h P Jm . (1)
We say that system pSq is associated with the pair pF ,Pq. Hence, the following
result provides a characterization of the notion of coherence given in Definition 2.1.
(Theorem 4.4 in Gilio, 1990, see also Gilio, 1992; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2011, 2013b).
Theorem 1 The function P defined on an arbitrary family of conditional events
K is coherent if and only if, for every finite subsequence F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq
of K, denoting by P the vector pp1, . . . , pnq, where pj “ P pEj |Hjq, j “ 1, 2, . . . , n,
the system pSq associated with the pair pF ,Pq is solvable.
We recall now some results on the coherence checking of a probability assessment on
a finite family of conditional events. Given a probability assessmentP “ pp1, . . . , pnq
on F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq, let S be the set of solutions Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λmq of the
system pSq. Then, assuming S ‰ H, we define
ΦjpΛq “ Φjpλ1, . . . , λmq “
ř
r:CrĎHj
λr , j P Jn ; Λ P S ;
Mj “ maxΛPS ΦjpΛq , j P Jn,
(2)
and
I0 “ tj :P Jn : Mj “ 0u. (3)
If S ‰ H, then S is a closed bounded set and the maximumMj of the linear function
ΦjpΛq “
ř
r:CrĎHj
λr there exists for every j P Jn. Assuming P coherent, each
solution Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λmq of system pSq is a coherent extension of the assessment
P on F to the sequence pC1|Hn, C2|Hn, . . . , Cm|Hnq. Then, for each solution Λ of
system pSq the quantity ΦjpΛq is the conditional probability ppHj |Hnq. Moreover,
the quantity Mj is the upper probability p
2
pHj |Hnq over all the solutions Λ of
system pSq. Of course, j P I0 if and only if p
2
pHj |Hnq “ 0. Notice that I0 is
a strict subset of Jn. If I0 is nonempty, we set F0 “ pEi|Hi P F , i P I0q and
P0 “ pppEi|Hiq, i P I0q. We say that the pair pF0,P0q is associated with I0. Then,
we have (Theorem 3.3 in Gilio, 1993):
Theorem 2 The assessment P on F is coherent if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied: (i) the system pSq associated with the pair pF ,Pq is
solvable; (ii) if I0 ‰ H, then P0 is coherent.
Let S 1 be a nonempty subset of the set of solutions S of system pSq. We denote by
I 10 the set I0 defined as in (3), where S is replaced by S
1, that is
I 10 “ tj :P Jn : M
1
j “ 0u, where M
1
j “ max
ΛPS1
ΦjpΛq , j P Jn. (4)
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Moreover, we denote by pF 10,P
1
0q the pair associated with I
1
0. Then, we obtain (see,
e.g., (Theorem 7 in Biazzo et al., 2003))
Theorem 3 The assessment P on F is coherent if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied: (i) the system pSq associated with the pair pF ,Pq is
solvable; (ii) if I 10 ‰ H, then P
1
0 is coherent.
We recall the following extension theorem for conditional probability, which is
a generalization of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem of probability to conditional
events (see, e.g., Biazzo & Gilio, 2000; Coletti & Scozzafava, 1996; Holzer, 1985;
Regazzini, 1985; Williams, 1975).
Theorem 4 Let a coherent probability assessment P “ pp1, . . . , pnq on a sequence
F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq be given. Moreover, given a further conditional event
En`1|Hn`1. Then, there exists a suitable closed interval rz
1, z2s Ď r0, 1s such that
the extension pP , zq of P to pF , En`1|Hn`1q is coherent if and only if z P rz
1, z2s.
Theorem 4 states that a coherent assessment of premises can always be coherently
extended to a conclusion, specifically there always exists an interval rz1, z2s Ď r0, 1s
of all coherent extensions on the conclusion. A non informative or illusory restriction
is obtained when rz1, z2s “ r0, 1s. The extension is unique when z1 “ z2. For
applying Theorem 4, we now recall an algorithm which allows for computing the
lower and upper bounds z1 and z2 of the interval of all coherent extensions on
En`1|Hn`1. (see Algorithm 1 in Gilio et al., 2016, which is originally based on
Algorithm 2 in Biazzo & Gilio, 2000).
Algorithm 1 Let F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq be a sequence of conditional events and
P “ pp1, . . . , pnq be a coherent precise probability assessment on F , where pj “
ppEj |Hjq P r0, 1s, j “ 1, . . . , n. Moreover, let En`1|Hn`1 be a further conditional
event and denote by Jn`1 the set t1, . . . , n ` 1u. The steps below describe the
computation of the lower bound z1 (resp., the upper bound z2) for the coherent
extensions z “ ppEn`1|Hn`1q.
‚ Step 0. Expand the expression
Ź
jPJn`1
`
EjHj _ sEjHj _ sHj˘ and denote by
C1, . . . , Cm the constituents contained in Hn`1 “
Ž
jPJn`1
Hj associated
with pF , En`1|Hn`1q. Then, construct the following system in the unknowns
λ1, . . . , λm, z $&
%
ř
r:CrĎEn`1Hn`1
λr “ z
ř
r:CrĎHn`1
λr ;ř
r:CrĎEjHj
λr “ pj
ř
r:CrĎHj
λr, j P Jn ;ř
rPJm
λr “ 1; λr ě 0, r P Jm .
(5)
‚ Step 1. Check the solvability of system (5) under the condition z “ 0 (resp., z “ 1).
If it is not solvable, go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 3.
‚ Step 2. Solve the following linear programming problem
Compute : γ1 “ min
ÿ
r:CrĎEn`1Hn`1
λr
(respectively : γ2 “ max
ÿ
r:CrĎEn`1Hn`1
λr q
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subject to: " ř
r:CrĎEjHj
λr “ pj
ř
r:CrĎHj
λr, j P Jn ;ř
r:CrĎHn`1
λr “ 1; λr ě 0, r P Jm .
The minimum γ1 (respectively the maximum γ2) of the objective function coincides
with z1 (respectively with z2) and the procedure stops.
‚ Step 3. For each subscript j P Jn`1, compute the maximum Mj of the function
Φj “
ř
r:CrĎHj
λr, subject to the constraints given by the system (5) with z “ 0
(respectively z “ 1). We have the following three cases:
1. Mn`1 ą 0 ;
2. Mn`1 “ 0 , Mj ą 0 for every j ‰ n` 1 ;
3. Mj “ 0 for j P I0 “ J Y tn` 1u , with J ‰ H .
In the first two cases z1 “ 0 (respectively z2 “ 1) and the procedure stops.
In the third case, defining I0 “ J Y tn` 1u, set Jn`1 “ I0 and pF ,Pq “ pFJ ,PJq,
where FJ “ pEi|Hi : i P Jq and PJ “ ppi : i P Jq. Then, go to Step 0.
The procedure ends in a finite number of cycles by computing the value z1
(respectively z2).
Remark 2.2. Assuming pP , zq on pF , En`1|Hn`1q coherent, each solution Λ “
pλ1, . . . , λmq of System (5) is a coherent extension of the assessment pP , zq to the
sequence pC1|Hn`1, . . . , Cm|Hn`1q.
Definition 2.3. An imprecise, or set-valued, assessment I on a finite sequence
of n conditional events F is a (possibly empty) set of precise assessments P on F .
Definition 2.3., introduced in Gilio & Ingrassia (1998), states that an imprecise
(probability) assessment I on a finite sequence F of n conditional events is just a
(possibly empty) subset of r0, 1sn. If an imprecise assessment I on F , with I “
I1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ In, where Ii Ď r0, 1s, i “ 1, . . . , n, then I on F can be formulated in
terms of constraints on the probability of the single events in F , i.e.,
pppE1|H1q P I1, . . . , ppEn|Hnq P Inq. (6)
We recall the notions of g-coherence and total-coherence for imprecise (in the sense
of set-valued) probability assessments (Gilio & Ingrassia, 1998; Gilio et al., 2016).
Definition 2.4. Let a sequence of n conditional events F be given. An imprecise
assessment I Ď r0, 1sn on F is g-coherent if and only if there exists a coherent
precise assessment P on F such that P P I.
Definition 2.5. An imprecise assessment I on F is totally coherent (t-
coherent) if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) I is non-empty;
(ii) if P P I, then P is a coherent precise assessment on F .
We denote by Π the set of all coherent precise assessments on F . We recall that
if there are no logical relations among the events E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn involved in
F , that is E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn are logically independent, then the set Π associated
with F is the whole unit hypercube r0, 1sn. If there are logical relations, then the
set Π could be a strict subset of r0, 1sn. As it is well known Π ‰ H; therefore,
H ‰ Π Ď r0, 1sn.
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Remark 2.6. We observe that:
I is g-coherent ðñ ΠX I ‰ H
I is t-coherent ðñ H ‰ ΠX I “ I .
Then: I is t-coherent ñ I is g-coherent.
Definition 2.7. Let I be a g-coherent assessment on F “ pE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnq;
moreover, let En`1|Hn`1 be a further conditional event and let J be an extension
of I to pF , En`1|Hn`1q. We say that J is a g-coherent extension of I if and only
if J is g-coherent.
Given a g-coherent assessment I on a sequence of n conditional events F , for
each coherent precise assessment P on F , with P P I, we denote by rαP , βP s the
interval of coherent extensions of P to En`1|Hn`1; that is, the assessment pP , zq
on pF , En`1|Hn`1q is coherent if and only if z P rz
1
P
, z2
P
s. Then, defining the set
Σ “
Ť
PPΠXIrz
1
P
, z2
P
s , (7)
for every z P Σ, the assessment I ˆ tzu is a g-coherent extension of I to
pF , En`1|Hn`1q; moreover, for every z P r0, 1szΣ, the extension I ˆ tzu of I
to pF , En`1|Hn`1q is not g-coherent. We say that Σ is the set of (all) coherent
extensions of the imprecise assessment I on F to the conditional event En`1|Hn`1.
Of course, as I is g-coherent, Σ ‰ H.
§3. Validity and Existential Import. We define the validity of a
probabilistic inference rule as follows:
Definition 3.8. Given a g-coherent assessment I on a sequence of n conditional
events F and a non-empty imprecise assessment I 1 on a conditional event
En`1|Hn`1, we say that the (probabilistic) inference
from I on F infer I 1 on En`1|Hn`1
is valid (denoted by |ù) if and only if Σ Ď I 1, where Σ is the set of coherent
extensions of the imprecise assessment I on F . Moreover, we call a valid inference
strictly valid (s-valid, denoted by |ùs) if and only if I
1 “ Σ.
Remark 3.9. Let from I on F infer I 1 on En`1|Hn`1 be a valid inference, let
Is be a g-coherent subset of I, and let Iw be a supset of I
1. Denoting by Σs the set
of coherent extensions of the imprecise assessment Is, we observe thatH ‰ Σs Ď Σ.
Then, by Definition 3.8., the following inference is valid
from Is on F infer I
1
w on En`1|Hn`1.
Thus, by starting from a valid inference we obtain valid inferences if the premises
are strengthened or the conclusion is weakened.
In the next remark we explain how Adams’ notion of p-validity (Adams, 1975)
is interpreted in the frameworks of coherence and how it relates to our notion of
s-validity.
Remark 3.10. We recall that a finite sequence of conditional events F “
pE1|H1, E2|H2, . . . , En|Hnq is p-consistent if and only if the assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q
on F is coherent. In addition, a p-consistent family F p-entails a conditional event
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En`1|Hn`1 if and only if the unique coherent extension on En`1|Hn`1 of the
assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F is P pEn`1|Hn`1q “ 1 (see, e.g., Gilio & Sanfilippo,
2013a). The inference from F to En`1|Hn`1 is p-valid if and only if F p-
entails En`1|Hn`1. We observe that p-valid inferences are special cases of s-valid
inferences, specifically when, in Definition 3.8., I “ p1, 1, . . . , 1q and I 1 “ t1u.
Definition 3.11. The conditional event existential import assumption is defined
by assuming that the conditional probability of the conditioning event of the minor
premise of a syllogism given the disjunction of all conditioning events of the
syllogism is positive.
For Datisi, the conditional event existential import assumption is
ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0, which makes Datisi probabilistically informative:
(Datisi) ppP |Mq “ 1, ppS|Mq ą 0, and ppM |S _Mq ą 0 ùñ ppP |Sq ą 0 .
We will also consider the following
Definition 3.12. The unconditional event existential import assumption is
defined by assuming that the probability of the conditioning event of the minor
premise is positive.
Remark 3.13. Let H1, H2, and H3 (where some of them may coincide)
denote the conditioning event of the major premise, the minor premise, and
of the conclusion, respectively. Then, the unconditional event existential import
assumption is ppH2q ą 0 while the conditional event existential import assumption
is ppH2|pH1 _H2 _H3qq ą 0. We observe that in general ppH2q “ ppH2 ^ pH1 _
H2 _H3qq “ ppH2|pH1 _H2 _H3qqppH1 _H2 _H3q. Then,
ppH2q ą 0 ùñ ppH2|pH1 _H2 _H3qq ą 0. (8)
However, the converse of (8) does not hold. Indeed, in the framework of coherence
it could be that ppH2q “ 0 even if ppH2|pH1 _H2 _H3qq ą 0, because ppH2|pH1 _
H2 _ H3qq ą 0, ppH1 _ H2 _ H3q “ 0, and ppH2q “ 0 is coherent. Therefore,
Definition 3.12. is stronger than Definition 3.11..
§4. Figure I. In this section, we prove that the probabilistic inference of C|A
from the premise set pC|B,B|Aq, which corresponds to the transitive structure
of the general form of syllogisms of Figure I, is probabilistically non-informative.
Specifically, we prove that the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on pC|B,B|A,C|Aq is
t-coherent. This t-coherence implies that: piq the assessment r0, 1s2 on pC|B,B|Aq
is t-coherent, which means that any assessment px, yq P r0, 1s2 on the premise
set pC|B,B|Aq is coherent; piiq the degree of belief in the conclusion C|A is not
constrained by the degrees of belief in the premises, since any value z P r0, 1s is a
coherent extension of a given pair px, yq on pC|B,B|Aq. Then, in order to obtain
probabilistic informativeness, we add the probabilistic constraint ppB|pA_Bqq ą 0
to the premise set. This constraint serves as the conditional event existential import
assumption of syllogisms of Figure I according to Definition 3.11.. We show that
the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on pC|B,B|A,B|pA _ Bqq is t-coherent. Then, we
recall the precise and imprecise probability propagation rules for the inference from
pC|B,A|B,B|pA _ Bqq to C|A. We apply these results in Section 4.2., where we
study the valid syllogisms of Figure I. Contrary to first order monadic predicate
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logic, which requires existential import assumptions for Barbari and Celaront only
(see Table 1), our probabilistic existential import assumption is required for all
valid syllogisms of Figure I.
4.1. Coherence and Probability Propagation in Figure I. We prove the
t-coherence of the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on the sequence of conditional events
involved in our probabilistic interpretation of syllogisms of Figure I.
Proposition 1 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on F “ pC|B,B|A,C|Aq is t-coherent.
Proof. Let P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 be any precise assessment on F . The constituents
Ch and the points Qh associated with pF ,Pq are given in Table 3. By Theorem 2,
Table 3: Constituents Ch and points Qh associated with the prevision assessment
P “ px, y, zq on pC|B,B|A,C|Aq involved in Figure I.
Ch Qh
C1 ABC p1, 1, 1q Q1
C2 AB sC p0, 1, 0q Q2
C3 A sBC px, 0, 1q Q3
C4 A sB sC px, 0, 0q Q4
C5 sABC p1, y, zq Q5
C6 sAB sC p0, y, zq Q6
C0 sA sB px, y, zq Q0 “ P
coherence of P on F requires that the following system
pSq P “
ř6
h“1 λhQh,
ř6
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 6.
is solvable. In geometrical terms, this means that the condition P P I is satisfied,
where I is the convex hull of Q1, . . . , Q6. We observe that P “ xQ5 ` p1 ´ xqQ6,
indeed it holds that px, y, zq “ xp1, y, zq ` p1 ´ xqp0, y, zq. Thus, system pSq is
solvable and a solution is Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λ6q “ p0, 0, 0, 0, x, 1 ´ xq. From (2) we
obtain that Φ1pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎB
λh “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ x ` 1 ´ x “ 1, Φ2pΛq “
Φ3pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎA
λh “ λ1`λ2`λ3`λ4 “ 0. Let S
1 “ tp0, 0, 0, 0, x, 1´xqu denote
a subset of the set S of all solutions of pSq. Then, M 11 “ maxtΦ1 : Λ P S
1u ą 0
and hence I 10 “ t2, 3u (as defined in (4)). By Theorem 3, as pSq is solvable and
I 10 “ t2, 3u, it is sufficient to check the coherence of the sub-assessment P
1
0 “ py, zq
on F 10 “ pB|A,C|Aq in order to check the coherence of px, y, zq. The constituents
Ch associated with the new pair ppB|A,C|Aq, py, zqq contained in H2 “ A are
C1 “ ABC,C2 “ AB sC,C3 “ A sBC,C4 “ A sB sC and the corresponding points Qh
are Q1 “ p1, 1q, Q2 “ p1, 0q, Q3 “ p0, 1q, Q4 “ p0, 0q. The convex hull I of the points
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 is the unit square r0, 1s
2. Then py, zq P r0, 1s2 trivially belongs to I
and hence the system
pSq : py, zq “ λ1Q1 ` λ2Q2 ` λ3Q3 ` λ4Q4, λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1, λh ě 0,
is solvable. Moreover, as Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎA
λh “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
for every solution Λ of pSq, it follows that (the new) I0 (as defined in (3)) is empty
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Table 4: Constituents Ch and points Qh associated with the prevision assessment
P “ px, y, tq on pC|B,B|A,A|pA _Bqq involved in the premise set of Figure I.
Ch Qh
C1 ABC p1, 1, 1q Q1
C2 AB sC p0, 1, 1q Q2
C3 A sBC px, 0, 1q Q3
C4 A sB sC px, 0, 1q Q4
C5 sABC p1, y, 0q Q5
C6 sAB sC p0, y, 0q Q6
C0 sA sB px, y, tq Q0 “ P
and, by Theorem 2, py, zq is coherent. Then, P “ px, y, zq is coherent. Therefore, as
any precise probability assessment P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 on F is coherent, it follows
that the imprecise assessment I “ r0, 1s3 on F is t-coherent. ˝
We now prove the t-coherence of the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on the
sequence of conditional events pC|B,B|A,A|pA _ Bqq. This sequence is involved
in our probabilistic interpretation of the premise set of Figure I and includes the
conditional event used in our existential import assumption.
Proposition 2 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on F “ pC|B,B|A,A|pA _Bqq is t-coherent.
Proof. Let P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 be a probability assessment on F . The constituents
Ch and the points Qh associated with pF ,Pq are given in Table 4. By Theorem 2,
coherence of P “ px, y, zq on F requires that the following system is solvable
pSq P “
ř6
h“1 λhQh,
ř6
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 6,
that is$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` xλ3 ` xλ4 ` λ5 “ x,
λ1 ` λ2 ` yλ5 ` yλ6 “ y,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ t,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
ðñ
$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ2 “ ypλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ t,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
(9)
or equivalently$’’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xyt` xp1 ´ tq,
λ1 ` λ2 “ yt,
λ3 ` λ4 “ 1´ yt,
λ5 ` λ6 “ 1´ t,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
ðñ
$’’’’&
’’’’%
λ5 “ xyt` xp1 ´ tq ´ λ1,
λ2 “ yt´ λ1,
λ3 “ tp1´ yq ´ λ4,
λ6 “ p1´ tqp1´ xq ´ xyt` λ1
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(10)
As px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 it holds that maxt0, xyt´p1´tqp1´xqu ď mintxyt`xp1´tq, ytu.
Then, the System pSq is solvable and the set of all solutions S is the set of vectors
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Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λ6q such that$’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
maxt0, xyt´ p1´ tqp1 ´ xqu ď λ1 ď mintxyt` xp1 ´ tq, ytu,
λ2 “ yt´ λ1,
λ3 “ tp1´ yq ´ λ4,
0 ď λ4 ď tp1´ yq,
λ5 “ xyt` xp1´ tq ´ λ1,
λ6 “ p1´ tqp1 ´ xq ´ xyt` λ1.
For each conditional event A, B, and A_B in F we associate the function Φ1pΛq “ř
h:ChĎA
λh “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4, Φ2pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎB
λh “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ5 ` λ6, and
Φ3pΛq “ λ1`. . .`λ6, respectively, as defined in (2). We observe that Φ3pΛq “ 1 ą 0
for each solution Λ P S and hence M3 “ maxtΦ3 : Λ P Su ą 0. Then, concerning
the strict subset I0 of t1, 2, 3u (defined in (3)), we obtain I0 Ď t1, 2u. Notice that I0
cannot be equal to t1, 2u, because Φ3pΛq ą 0 implies that at least Φ1pΛq or Φ2pΛq
is positive, for each Λ P S. Then, M1 “ maxtΦ1 : Λ P Su and M2 “ maxtΦ2 : Λ P
Su cannot be equal to zero and hence I0 Ă t1, 2u. Therefore, we distinguish the
following three cases: piq I0 “ H; piiq I0 “ t1u; piiiq I0 “ t2u.
Case piq. As pSq is solvable, we obtain that the assessmentP “ px, y, tq is coherent
by Theorem 2.
Case piiq. The assessment P0 “ x P r0, 1s on F0 “ tC|Bu is coherent because B
and C are logically independent. Then, as pSq is solvable and P0 on F0 is coherent,
we obtain by Theorem 2 that the assessment P “ px, y, tq is coherent.
Case piiiq is analogous to Case piiq, where C and B are replaced by B and A,
respectively.
Therefore, the assessment P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 is coherent for every px, y, tq P
r0, 1s3, that is the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on F is t-coherent. ˝
We recall the following probability propagation rule for the inference form: from
pC|B,B|A,A|pA _Bqq to C|A (Theorem 3 in Gilio et al., 2016).
Theorem 5 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and px, y, tq P r0, 1s3
be any (coherent) assessment on the family pC|B,B|A,A|A _ Bq. Then, the
extension z “ P pC|Aq is coherent if and only if z P rz1, z2s, where
rz1, z2s “
#
r0, 1s, t “ 0;”
max
!
0, xy ´ p1´tqp1´xq
t
)
,min
 
1, p1´ xqp1 ´ yq ` x
t
(ı
, t ą 0 .
We also recall the probability propagation rule to C|A in the case of interval-valued
probability assessment on pC|B,B|A,A|pA_Bqq (Theorem 4 in Gilio et al., 2016).
Theorem 6 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and I “ prx1, x2s ˆ
ry1, y2s ˆ rt1, t2sq Ď r0, 1s
3 be an imprecise (totally-coherent) assessment on
pC|B,B|A,A|A_Bq. Then, the set Σ of the coherent extension of I is the interval
rz˚, z˚˚s, where rz˚, z˚˚s “#
r0, 1s, t “ 0;”
max
!
0, x1y1 ´
p1´t1qp1´x1q
t1
)
,min
!
1, p1´ x2qp1´ y1q `
x2
t1
)ı
, t ą 0 .
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4.2. Traditionally Valid Syllogisms of Figure I. In this section we
consider the probabilistic interpretation of the valid syllogisms of Figure I (see
Table 1). Specifically, we firstly recall Barbara, Barbari, and Darii (Gilio et al.,
2016). Secondly, we analyze Celarent, Celaront, and Ferio. We use the probabilistic
interpretation of the basic syllogistic sentence types given in Table 2. By
instantiating in Proposition 1 the subject S, the middle M , and the predicate P
term for the events A,B,C, respectively, we observe that the imprecise assessment
r0, 1s3 on pP |M,M |S, P |Sq is t-coherent. This implies that all syllogisms of Figure
I are probabilistically non-informative. For instance, modus Barbara (“Every M is
P , Every S is M , therefore Every S is P”) without existential import assumption
corresponds to the probabilistically non-informative inference: from the premises
ppP |Mq “ 1 and ppM |Sq “ 1 infer that every ppP |Sq P r0, 1s is coherent. Indeed, by
Proposition 1, a probability assessment p1, 1, zq on pP |M,M |S, P |Sq is coherent for
every z P r0, 1s. In order to construct probabilistically informative versions of valid
syllogisms of Figure I, we add the conditional event existential import assumption
to the probabilistic interpretation of the respective premise set: ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0
(see Definition 3.11.). We now demonstrate the validity (and when possible the
s-validity) of traditionally valid syllogisms by suitable instantiations in Theorem 5
within our semantics.
Barbara. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ y “ 1
and any value t ą 0 it follows that z1 “ max
!
0, xy ´ p1´tqp1´xq
t
)
“ 1 and z2 “
mint1, p1 ´ xqp1 ´ yq ` x
t
u “ 1. Then, the set Σ (see Equation (7)) of coherent
extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment t1uˆt1uˆp0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS_
Mqq is Σ “ t1u. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq |ùs t1u on P |S. (11)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (11) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 1 , (12)
which is a s-valid (and probabilistically informative) version of Barbara (under the
conditional event existential import assumption).
Remark 4.14. By instantiating Remark 3.13. to syllogisms of Figure I we obtain
that ppSq “ ppS ^ pS _Mqq “ ppS|pS _MqqP pS _Mq. Hence, if ppSq ą 0 then
ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0. Then, as ppSq ą 0 implies ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0, from (12) it
follows that
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppSq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 1, (13)
which is an s-valid version of Barbara under the (stronger) unconditional existential
import assumption.
Barbari. From (12), by weakening the conclusion, it follows that
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ù ppP |Sq ą 0 , (14)
which is a valid (but not s-valid) version of Barbari (“Every M is P , Every S is
M , therefore Some S is P”).
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Darii. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ 1, any y ą
0, and any t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ max
!
0, xy ´ p1´tqp1´xq
t
)
“ y ą 0 and
z2 “ mint1, p1 ´ xqp1 ´ yq ` x
t
u “ 1. Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on
P |S of the imprecise assessment t1u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq is
Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt1uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sury, 1s “ p0, 1s. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on P |S. (15)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (15) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppM |Sq ą 0, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq ą 0 , (16)
which is a s-valid version of Darii (Every M is P , Some S is M , therefore Some S
is P ). Notice that Barbari (14) also follows from Darii (16) by strengthening the
minor premise.
Celarent. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ 0, y “ 1,
and t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ max
!
0, xy ´ p1´tqp1´xq
t
)
“ 0 and z2 “ mint1, p1 ´
xqp1´ yq ` x
t
u “ 0. Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise
assessment t0u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq is Σ “ t0u. Thus, by
Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq |ùs t0u on P |S. (17)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (17) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 0 , (18)
which is a s-valid version of Celarent (No M is P , Every S is M , therefore No S
is P ).
Celaront. From (18), by weakening the conclusion, it follows that
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ù pp sP |Sq ą 0 , (19)
which is valid version of Celaront (No M is P , Every S is M , therefore Some S is
not P ).
Ferio. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ 0, any y ą
0, and any t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ max
!
0, xy ´ p1´tqp1´xq
t
)
“ 0 and z2 “
mint1, p1´ xqp1 ´ yq ` x
t
u “ 1´ y ă 1. Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on
P |S of the imprecise assessment t0u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq is
Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt0uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sur0, 1´ ys “ r0, 1q. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,M |S, S|pS _Mqq |ùs r0, 1q on P |S. (20)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (20) can be equivalently expressed by (see
Table 2)
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppM |Sq ą 0, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 ,
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which is a s-valid version of Ferio (No M is P , Some S is M , therefore Some S is
not P ). Notice that Celaront (19) also follows from Ferio (21) by strengthening the
minor premise.
§5. Figure II. In this section, we prove that the probabilistic inference ofsC|A from the premise set pB|C, sB|Aq, which corresponds to the general form of
syllogisms of Figure II, is probabilistically non-informative. Like in Section §4., we
show that the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on pB|C, sB|A, sC|Aq is t-coherent. Then,
in order to obtain probabilistic informativeness, we add the probabilistic constraint
ppA|pA _ Cqq ą 0 to the premise set, which corresponds to the conditional event
existential import assumption of syllogisms of Figure II according to Definition
3.11.. After showing that the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _
Cqq is t-coherent, we prove the precise and imprecise probability propagation rules
for the inference from pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq to sC|A. We apply these results in
Section 5.2., where we study the valid syllogisms of Figure II.
5.1. Coherence and Probability Propagation in Figure II. We prove the
t-coherence of the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on the sequence of conditional events
pB|C, sB|A, sC|Aq.
Proposition 3 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on F “ pB|C, sB|A, sC|Aq is t-coherent.
Proof. Let P “ px, y, zq P r0, 1s3 be any probability assessment on F . The
constituents Ch and the points Qh associated with pF ,Pq are given in Table 5. The
Table 5: Constituents Ch and points Qh associated with the prevision assessment
P “ px, y, zq on pB|C, sB|A, sC|Aq involved in Figure II.
Ch Qh
C1 ABC p1, 0, 0q Q1
C2 AB sC px, 0, 1q Q2
C3 A sBC p0, 1, 0q Q3
C4 A sB sC px, 1, 1q Q4
C5 sABC p1, y, zq Q5
C6 sA sBC p0, y, zq Q6
C0 sA sC px, y, zq Q0 “ P
constituents Ch contained in H3 “ A_C are C1, . . . , C6. We recall that coherence
of P “ px, y, zq on F requires that the condition P P I is satisfied, where I is the
convex hull of Q1, . . . , Q6. This amounts to the solvability of the following system:
pSq P “
ř6
h“1 λhQh,
ř6
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 6.
We observe that P “ px, y, zq “ xp1, y, zq ` p1 ´ xqp0, y, zq “ xQ5 ` p1 ´ xqQ6,
that is system pSq is solvable and a solution is Λ “ p0, 0, 0, 0, x, 1 ´ xq. As
Φ2pΛq “ Φ3pΛq “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 0, it holds that I
1
0 “ t2, 3u. Then,
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by Theorem 3, in order to check coherence of px, y, zq P r0, 1s3 it is sufficient
to check the coherence of the sub-assessment py, zq P r0, 1s2 on p sB|A, sC|Aq. The
constituents Ch associated to the pair pp sB|A, sC|Aq, py, zqq contained in H2 “ A
are C1 “ ABC,C2 “ AB sC,C3 “ A sBC,C4 “ A sB sC and the corresponding points
Qh are Q1 “ p0, 0q, Q2 “ p0, 1q, Q3 “ p1, 0q, Q4 “ p1, 1q. The convex hull I of
the points Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 is the unit square r0, 1s
2. Then py, zq P r0, 1s2 trivially
belongs to I and hence the system py, zq “ λ1Q1`λ2Q2`λ3Q3`λ4Q4 has always
a nonnegative solution pλ1, λ2, λ3, λ4q with λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1. Moreover, as
Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1, it follows that I0 “ H and hence py, zq is
coherent. ˝
Proposition 4 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The assessment
px, y, tq on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA_ Cqq is coherent for every px, y, zq P r0, 1s3.
Proof. Let P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 be a probability assessment on F . The constituents
Ch and the points Qh associated with pF ,Pq are given in Table 6. By Theorem 2,
Table 6: Constituents Ch and points Qh associated with the prevision assessment
P “ px, y, tq on F “ pB|C, sB|A,A|pA_Cqq involved in the premise set of Figure II.
Ch Qh
C1 ABC p1, 0, 1q Q1
C2 AB sC px, 0, 1q Q2
C3 A sBC p0, 1, 1q Q3
C4 A sB sC px, 1, 1q Q4
C5 sABC p1, y, 0q Q5
C6 sA sBC p0, y, 0q Q6
C0 sA sC px, y, tq Q0 “ P
coherence of P “ px, y, zq on F requires that the following system is solvable
pSq P “
ř6
h“1 λhQh,
ř6
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 6,
or equivalently$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ3 ` λ4 “ yt,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ t,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
ðñ
$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ3 ` λ4 “ yt,
λ1 ` λ2 “ tp1 ´ yq,
λ5 ` λ6 “ 1´ t,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
(22)
System pSq is solvable and a subset S 1 of the set of solutions consists of Λ “
pλ1, . . . , λ6q such that $’’&
’’%
λ1 “ λ3 “ 0, λ2 “ tp1´ yq,
λ4 “ yt, λ5 “ xp1´ tq,
λ6 “ p1´ xqp1 ´ tq,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(23)
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Moreover, for each Λ P S 1 it holds that Φ1pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎC
“ λ1`λ3`λ5`λ6 “ 1´t,
Φ2pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎA
“ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ t and Φ3pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎA_C
λh “ 1 ą 0.
If 0 ă t ă 1, it holds that I 10 “ H, hence, by Theorem 3, px, y, tq is coherent.
If t “ 0, it holds that I 10 “ t2u and as the sub-assessment y P r0, 1s on
sB|A is
coherent, it follows by Theorem 3 that px, y, tq is coherent. Likewise, if t “ 1, it
holds that I 10 “ t1u and as the sub-assessment x P r0, 1s on B|C is coherent, it
follows by Theorem 3 that px, y, tq is coherent. Then, px, y, tq is coherent for every
px, y, tq P r0, 1s3. ˝
The next result allows for computing the lower and upper bounds, z1 and z2
respectively, for the coherent extensions z “ pp sC|Aq from the assessment px, y, tq
on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq.
Theorem 7 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and px, y, tq P r0, 1s3
be any assessment on the family pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq. Then, the extension z “
P p sC|Aq is coherent if and only if z P rz1, z2s, where
rz1, z2s “
$’’’&
’’’%
r0, 1s , if t ď x` yt ď 1,“x` yt´ 1
t x
, 1
‰
, if x` yt ą 1,“ t´ x´ yt
t p1´ xq
, 1
‰
, if x` yt ă t.
Proof. Let px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 be a generic assessment on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq.
We recall that px, y, tq is coherent (Proposition 4). In order to prove the theorem
we derive the coherent lower and upper probability bounds z1 and z2 by applying
Algorithm 1 in a symbolic way.
Computation of the lower probability bound z1 on sC|A.
Input. F “ pB|C, sB|A,A|pA_ Cqq, En`1|Hn`1 “ sC|A.
Step 0. The constituents associated with pB|C, sB|A,A|pA_Cq, sC|Aq and contained
in Hn`1 “ A _ C are C1 “ ABC ,C2 “ AB sC ,C3 “ A sBC ,C4 “ A sB sC ,C5 “sABC , and C6 “ sA sBC. We construct the following starting system with unknowns
λ1, . . . , λ6, z (see Remark 2.2.):$’’&
’’%
λ2 ` λ4 “ zpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q, λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ3 ` λ4 “ ypλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ tpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(24)
Step 1. By setting z “ 0 in System (24), we obtain$’’&
’’%
λ2 ` λ4 “ 0, λ1 ` λ5 “ x,
λ3 “ ypλ1 ` λ3q, λ1 ` λ3 “ t,
λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
ðñ
$’’&
’’%
λ1 “ tp1´ yq, λ2 “ 0, λ3 “ yt,
λ4 “ 0, λ5 “ x´ tp1 ´ yq,
λ6 “ 1´ x´ yt,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(25)
The solvability of System (25) is a necessary condition for the coherence of the
assessment px, y, t, 0q on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cq, sC|Aq. As px, y, tq P r0, 1s3, it holds
that: λ1 “ tp1 ´ yq ě 0, λ3 “ yt ě 0. Thus, System (25) is solvable if and only if
λ5 ě 0 and λ6 ě 0, that is
t´ yt ď x ď 1´ ytðñ t ď x` yt ď 1.
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We distinguish two cases: piq x`yt ą 1_x`yt ă t; piiq t ď x`yt ď 1. In Case piq,
System (25) is not solvable (which implies that the coherent extension z of px, y, tq
must be positive). Then, we go to Step 2 of the algorithm where the (positive) lower
bound z1 is obtained by optimization. In Case piiq, System (25) is solvable and in
order to check whether z “ 0 is a coherent extension, we go to Step 3.
Case piq. We observe that in this case t cannot be 0. By Step 2 we have the
following linear programming problem:
Compute z1 “ minpλ2 ` λ4q subject to:$&
%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q, λ3 ` λ4 “ ypλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ tpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
(26)
In this case, the constraints in (26) can be rewritten in the following way$’’&
’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ3 ` λ4 “ y, λ5 ` λ6 “
1´t
t
,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
ô
$’’&
’’%
1´ y ´ λ2 ` λ5 “ xp1 ´ λ2 ´ λ4 `
1´t
t
q,
λ3 “ y ´ λ4, λ6 “
1´t
t
´ λ5,
λ1 “ 1´ y ´ λ2,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
or equivalently"
xλ4 ` p1´ yq ` λ5 “ λ2p1´ xq `
x
t
, λ3 “ y ´ λ4,
λ5 “
1´t
t
´ λ6, λ1 “ 1´ y ´ λ2, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
We distinguish two (alternative) cases: pi.1q x` yt ą 1; pi.2q x` yt ă t.
Case pi.1q. The constraints in (26) can be rewritten in the following way"
xpλ2 ` λ4q “
x
t
´ p1´ yq ´ 1´t
t
` λ2 ` λ6, λ3 “ y ´ λ4,
λ5 “
1´t
t
´ λ6, λ1 “ 1´ y ´ λ2, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
As x ą 1´ ty, we observe that x ą 0. Then, the minimum of z “ λ2`λ4, obtained
when λ2 “ λ6 “ 0, is
z1 “
1
x
ˆ
x
t
´ p1´ yq ´
1´ t
t
˙
“
x´ t` yt´ 1` t
xt
“
x` yt´ 1
xt
. (27)
By choosing λ2 “ λ6 “ 0 the constraints in (26) are satisfied with"
λ1 “ 1´ y, λ2 “ 0, λ3 “ y ´
x`yt´1
xt
, λ4 “
x`yt´1
xt
,
λ5 “
1´t
t
, λ6 “ 0, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
In particular λ3 ě 0 is satisfied because the condition
x`yt´1
xt
ď y, which in this
case amounts to ytp1 ´ xq ď 1 ´ x, is always satisfied. Then, the procedure stops
yielding as output z1 “ x`yt´1
xt
.
Case pi.2q. The constraints in (26) can be rewritten in the following way"
p1´ yq ´ x
t
` λ5 ` λ4 “ λ2p1´ xq ´ xλ4 ` λ4, λ3 “ y ´ λ4,
λ6 “
1´t
t
´ λ5, λ1 “ 1´ y ´ λ2, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
or equivalently"
pλ2 ` λ4qp1´ xq “ p1´ yq ´
x
t
` λ4 ` λ5, λ3 “ y ´ λ4,
λ6 “
1´t
t
´ λ5, λ1 “ 1´ y ´ λ2, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
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As t´ yt´ x ą 0, that is x ă tp1´ yq, it holds that x ă 1. Then, the minimum of
z “ λ2 ` λ4, obtained when λ4 “ λ5 “ 0, is
z1 “
1
1´ x
´
1´ y ´
x
t
¯
“
t´ yt´ x
p1 ´ xqt
ě 0.
We observe that by choosing λ4 “ λ5 “ 0 the constraints in (26) are satisfied,
indeed they are "
λ1 “ 1´ y, λ2 “
t´yt´x
p1´xqt , λ3 “ y, λ4 “ 0,
λ5 “ 0, λ6 “
1´t
t
, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
Then, the procedure stops yielding as output z1 “ t´yt´xp1´xqt .
Case piiq. We take Step 3 of the algorithm. We denote by Λ and S the vector
of unknowns pλ1, . . . , λ6q and the set of solutions of System (25), respectively. We
consider the following linear functions (associated with the conditioning events
H1 “ C,H2 “ H4 “ A,H3 “ A_ C) and their maxima in S:
Φ1pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎC
λr “ λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6,
Φ2pΛq “ Φ4pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎA
λr “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4,
Φ3pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎA_C
λr “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 ,
Mi “ maxΛPS ΦipΛq, i “ 1, 2, 3, 4 .
(28)
By (25) we obtain: Φ1pΛq “ tp1´ yq` yt`x´ tp1´ yq` 1´x´ yt “ 1, Φ2pΛq “
Φ4pΛq “ tp1´yq`0`yt`0 “ t, Φ3pΛq “ tp1´yq`0`yt`0`x´tp1´yq`1´x´yt “ 1,
@Λ P S. Then, M1 “ 1, M2 “ M4 “ t, and M3 “ 1. We consider two subcases:
t ą 0; t “ 0. If t ą 0, then M4 ą 0 and we are in the first case of Step 3. Thus, the
procedure stops and yields z1 “ 0 as output.
If t “ 0, then M1 ą 0,M3 ą 0 and M2 “ M4 “ 0. Hence, we are in third case of
Step 3 with J “ t2u, I0 “ t2, 4u and the procedure restarts with Step 0, with F
replaced by FJ “ p sB|Aq.
(2nd cycle) Step 0. The constituents associated with p sB|A, sC|Aq, contained in A,
are C1 “ ABC,C2 “ AB sC,C3 “ A sBC,C4 “ A sB sC. The starting system is"
λ3 ` λ4 “ ypλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q, λ2 ` λ4 “ zpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 4 .
(29)
(2nd cycle) Step 1. By setting z “ 0 in System (29), we obtain 
λ1 “ 1´ y, λ2 “ λ4 “ 0, λ3 “ y, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 4 . (30)
As y P r0, 1s, System (30) is always solvable; thus, we go to Step 3.
(2nd cycle) Step 3. We denote by Λ and S the vector of unknowns pλ1, . . . , λ4q
and the set of solutions of System (30), respectively. The conditioning events are
H2 “ A and H4 “ A; then the associated linear functions are: Φ2pΛq “ Φ4pΛq “ř
r:CrĎA
λr “ λ1`λ2`λ3`λ4. From System (30), we obtain: Φ2pΛq “ Φ4pΛq “ 1,
@Λ P S; so that M2 “ M4 “ 1. We are in the first case of Step 3 of the algorithm;
then the procedure stops and yields z1 “ 0 as output.
To summarize, for any px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq, we have
computed the coherent lower bound z1 on sC|A. In particular, if t “ 0, then z1 “ 0.
We also have z1 “ 0, when t ą 0 and t ď x`yt ď 1, that is when 0 ă t ď x`yt ď 1.
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Then, we can write that z1 “ 0, when t ď x`yt ď 1. Otherwise, we have two cases:
pi.1q z1 “ x`yt´1
xt
, if x` yt ą 1; pi.2q z1 “ t´yt´xp1´xqt , if x` yt ă t.
Computation of the Upper Probability Bound z2 on sC|A.
Input and Step 0 are the same as in the proof of z1.
Step 1. By setting z “ 1 in System (24), we obtain$’’&
’%
λ1 ` λ3 “ 0, λ5 “ xpλ5 ` λ6q,
λ4 “ ypλ2 ` λ4q, λ2 ` λ4 “ t,
λ2 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
ðñ
$’’&
’%
λ1 “ λ3 “ 0, λ2 “ tp1´ yq,
λ4 “ yt, λ5 “ xp1´ tq,
λ6 “ p1´ xqp1 ´ tq,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(31)
As px, y, tq P r0, 1s3, System (31) is solvable and we go to Step 3.
Step 3. We denote by Λ and S the vector of unknowns pλ1, . . . , λ6q and the set
of solutions of System (31), respectively. We consider the functions given in (28).
From System (31), we obtain: Φ1pΛq “ 0 ` 0 ` xp1 ´ tq ` p1 ´ xqp1 ´ tq “ 1 ´ t,
Φ2pΛq “ Φ4pΛq “ 0` tp1´ yq`0` yt“ t, Φ3pΛq “ 0` tp1´ yq`0` yt`xp1´ tq`
p1´ xqp1´ tq “ 1, @Λ P S. Then, M1 “ 1´ t, M2 “M4 “ t, and M3 “ 1. If t ą 0,
then M4 ą 0 and we are in the first case of Step 3. Thus, the procedure stops and
yields z2 “ 1 as output. If t “ 0, then M1 ą 0,M3 ą 0 and M2 “ M4 “ 0. Hence,
we are in the third case of Step 3 with J “ t2u, I0 “ t2, 4u and the procedure
restarts with Step 0, with F replaced by FJ “ pE2|H2q “ p sB|Aq and P replaced
by PJ “ y.
(2nd cycle) Step 0. This is the same as the (2nd cycle) Step 0 in the proof of z1.
(2nd cycle) Step 1. By setting z “ 1 in System (24), we obtain 
λ1 ` λ3 “ 0, λ4 “ y, λ2 “ 1´ y, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 4 . (32)
As y P r0, 1s, System (32) is always solvable; thus, we go to Step 3.
(2nd cycle) Step 3. Like in the (2nd cycle) Step 3 of the proof of z1, we obtain
M4 “ 1. Thus, the procedure stops and yields z
2 “ 1 as output. To summarize, for
any assessment px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq, we have computed the
coherent upper probability bound z2 on sC|A, which is always z2 “ 1. ˝
Remark 5.15. We observe that in Theorem 7 we do not presuppose, differently
from the classical approach, positive probability for the conditioning events (A and
C). For example, even if we assume ppA|pA _ Cqq “ t ą 0 we do not require
positive probability for the conditioning event A, and ppAq could be zero (indeed,
since ppAq “ ppA^ pA_Cqq “ ppA|pA_CqqppA_Cq, ppAq ą 0 implies ppA|pA_
Cqq ą 0, but not vice versa).
The next result is based on Theorem 7 and presents the set of the coherent
extensions of a given interval-valued probability assessment I “ prx1, x2sˆry1, y2sˆ
rt1, t2sq Ď r0, 1s
3 on the sequence on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA_Cqq to the further conditional
event sC|A.
Theorem 8 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and I “ prx1, x2s ˆ
ry1, y2s ˆ rt1, t2sq Ď r0, 1s
3 be an imprecise assessment on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq.
Then, the set Σ of the coherent extensions of I on sC|A is the interval rz˚, z˚˚s,
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where
rz˚, z˚˚s “
$’’&
’’’%
r0, 1s , if px2 ` y2t1 ě t1q ^ px1 ` y1t1 ď 1q,“x1 ` y1t1 ´ 1
t1x1
, 1
‰
, if x1 ` y1t1 ą 1,“ t1 ´ x2 ´ y2t1
t1p1´ x2q
, 1
‰
, if x2 ` y2t1 ă t1.
Proof. As from Proposition 4 the set r0, 1s3 on pB|C, sB|A,A|pA _ Cqq is totally
coherent, then I is totally coherent too. Then, Σ “
Ť
PPIrz
1
P
, z2
P
s “ rz˚, z˚˚s,
where z˚ “ infPPI z
1
P
(i.e., z˚ “ inftz1
P
: P P Iu) and z˚˚ “ supPPI z
2
P
(i.e.,
z˚˚ “ suptz1
P
: P P Iu). We distinguish three alternative cases: piq x1 ` y1t1 ą 1;
piiq x2 ` y2t1 ă t1; piiiq px2 ` y2t1 ě t1q ^ px1 ` y1t1 ď 1q.
Of course, for all three cases z˚˚ “ supPPI z
2
P
“ 1.
Case piq. We observe that the function x ` yt : r0, 1s3 is nondecreasing in the
arguments x, y, t. Then, in this case, x`yt ě x1`y1t1 ą 1 for every P “ px, y, tq P I
and hence by Theorem 7 z1
P
“ fpx, y, tq “ x`yt´1
t x
for every P P I. Moreover,
fpx, y, tq : r0, 1s3 is nondecreasing in the arguments x, y, t, thus z˚ “ x1`y1t1´1
t1x1
.
Case piiq. We observe that the function x ` yt ´ t : r0, 1s3 is nondecreasing in the
arguments x, y and nonincreasing in the argument t. Then, in this case, x`yt´ t ď
x2 ` y2t1 ´ t1 ă 0 for every P “ px, y, tq P I and hence by Theorem 7 z
1
P
“
gpx, y, tq “ t´x´yt
tp1´xq for every P P I. Moreover, gpx, y, tq : r0, 1s
3 is nonincreasing in
the arguments x, y and nondecreasing in the argument t. Thus, z˚ “ t1´x2´y2t1
t1p1´x2q
.
Case piiiq. In this case there exists a vector px, y, tq P I such that t ď x ` yt ď 1
and hence by Theorem 7 z1
P
“ 0. Thus, z˚ “ 0. ˝
Remark 5.16. By instantiating Theorem 8 with the imprecise assessment I “
t1uˆ ry1, 1s ˆ rt1, 1s, where t1 ą 0, we obtain the following lower and upper bounds
for the conclusion rz˚, z˚˚s “ ry1, 1s. Thus, for every t1 ą 0: z
˚ depends only on
the value of y1.
5.2. Traditionally Valid Syllogisms of Figure II. In this section we
consider the probabilistic interpretation of the traditionally valid syllogisms of
Figure II (Camestres, Camestrop, Baroco, Cesare, Cesaro, Festino; see Table 1).
Like in Figure I, all syllogisms of Figure II without existential import assumptions
are probabilistically non-informative. Indeed, by instantiating S, M , P for A,
B, C, respectively, in Proposition 3, we observe that the imprecise assessment
r0, 1s3 on pM |P, ĎM |S, sP |Sq is t-coherent. For instance, Camestres (“Every P is
M , No S is M , therefore No S is P”) without existential import assumption
corresponds to the probabilistically non-informative inference: from the premises
ppM |P q “ 1 and ppĎM |Sq “ 1 infer that every pp sP |Sq P r0, 1s is coherent
(see Proposition 3). Therefore we add the conditional event existential import
assumption: ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0 (see Definition 3.11.). In what follows, we construct
(s-)valid versions of the traditionally valid syllogisms of Figure II, by suitable
instantiations in Theorem 7.
Camestres. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ y “ 1
and t ą 0 it follows that z1 “ x`yt´1
t x
“ 1 and z2 “ 1. Then, the set Σ of coherent
extensions on sP |S of the imprecise assessment t1uˆt1uˆp0, 1s on pM |P, ĎM |S, S|pS_
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P qq is Σ “ t1u. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq |ùs t1u on sP |S. (33)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (33) can be equivalently expressed by (see
Table 2)
pppM |P q “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 0, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 0 , (34)
which is a s-valid version of Camestres.
Camestrop. From (34), by weakening the conclusion of Camestres, it follows that
pppM |P q “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 0, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ù ppP |Sq ă 1 , (35)
which is equivalent to
pppM |P q “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 0, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ù pp sP |Sq ą 0. (36)
Inference (36) is a valid (but not s-valid) version of Camestrop (Every P is M , No
S is M , therefore Some S is not P ).
Baroco. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ 1, any y ą 0,
and any t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ x`yt´1
t x
“ 1`yt´1
t
“ y ą 0. Then, the set
Σ of coherent extensions on sP |S of the imprecise assessment t1u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s
on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq is Σ “ Ťtpx,y,tqPt1uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sury, 1s “ p0, 1s. Thus, by
Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq |ùs p0, 1s on sP |S. (37)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (37) can be expressed by,
pppM |P q “ 1, ppĎM |Sq ą 0, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 . (38)
Therefore, inference (38) is a s-valid version of Baroco (Every P is M , Some S is
not M , therefore Some S is not P ). Notice that Camestrop (36) also follows from
Baroco (38) by strengthening the minor premise.
Cesare. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ y “ 0 and
any t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ t´x´yt
t p1´xq “ 1 (and z
2 “ 1). Then, the set Σ of coherent
extensions on sP |S of the imprecise assessment t0uˆt0uˆp0, 1s on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS_
P q is Σ “ t1u. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ t0u ˆ p0, 1s on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq |ùs t1u on sP |S. (39)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (39) can be expressed by,
pppM |P q “ 0, ppM |Sq “ 0, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq “ 1 ,
or equivalently by
pppM |P q “ 0, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 0 . (40)
Therefore, inference (40) is a s-valid version of Cesare (No P is M , Every S is M ,
therefore No S is P ).
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Cesaro. From (40), by weakening the conclusion of Cesare, it follows that
pppM |P q “ 0, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ù pp sP |Sq ą 0 , (41)
which is a valid (but not s-valid) version of Cesaro (No P is M , Every S is M ,
therefore Some S is not P ).
Festino. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 7 for A,B,C with x “ 0, any y ă 1
and any t ą 0, as x ` yt ă t, it follows that z1 “ t´x´yt
t p1´xq “
t´yt
t
ą 1 ´ y ą 0 (and
z2 “ 1). Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment
t0u ˆ r0, 1q ˆ p0, 1s on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq is Σ “ Ťtpx,y,tqPt0uˆr0,1qˆp0,1sur1 ´
y, 1s “ p0, 1s. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ r0, 1q ˆ p0, 1s on pM |P, ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq |ùs p0, 1s on sP |S. (42)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (42) can be equivalently expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppM |Sq ą 0, ppS|pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 , (43)
which is a s-valid version of Festino (No P is M , Some S is M , therefore Some S
is not P ). Notice that Cesaro (41) also follows from Festino (43) by strengthening
the minor premise.
Remark 5.17. We observe that, traditionally, the conclusions of logically valid
Aristotelian syllogisms of Figure II are neither in the form of sentence type I ( some)
nor of A ( every). In terms of our probability semantics, indeed, this must be the
case even if the existential import assumption ppS|pS _P qq ą 0 is made: according
to Theorem 7, the upper bound for the conclusion pp sP |Sq is always 1; thus, neither
sentence type I (ppP |Sq ą 0, i.e. pp sP |Sq ă 1) nor sentence type A (ppP |Sq “ 1,
i.e. pp sP |Sq “ 0) can be validated.
§6. Figure III. In this section, we observe that the probabilistic inference
of C|A from the premise set pC|B,A|Bq, which corresponds to the general form
of syllogisms of Figure III, is probabilistically non-informative (Proposition 5).
Therefore, we add the probabilistic constraint ppB|pA _ Bqq ą 0, as conditional
event existential import assumption, to obtain probabilistic informativeness. Then,
we prove the precise and imprecise probability propagation rules for the inference
from pC|B,A|B,B|pA _Bqq to C|A. We apply these results in Section 6.2., where
we study the valid syllogisms of Figure III.
6.1. Coherence and Probability Propagation in Figure III.
Proposition 5 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on F “ pC|B,A|B,C|Aq is totally coherent.
Proof. By exchanging B and A and by reordering the sequence F , Proposition 5
is equivalent to Proposition 1. ˝
Now we show that the imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on the sequence of conditional
events pC|B,A|B,B|pA_Bqq is t-coherent. Note that the strategy used in the proof
of Proposition 5 cannot be applied for proving Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Let A,B,C be logically independent events. The imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on F “ pC|B,A|B,B|pA _Bqq is totally coherent.
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Proof. Let P “ px, y, tq P r0, 1s3 be a probability assessment on F . The constituents
Ch and the points Qh associated with pF ,Pq are given in Table 7. By Theorem 2,
Table 7: Constituents Ch and points Qh associated with the prevision assessment
P “ px, y, tq on F “ pC|B,A|B,B|pA_Bqq involved in the premise set of Figure III.
Ch Qh
C1 ABC p1, 1, 1q Q1
C2 AB sC p0, 1, 1q Q2
C3 A sB px, y, 0q Q3
C4 sABC p1, 0, 1q Q4
C5 sAB sC p0, 0, 1q Q5
C0 sA sB px, y, tq Q0 “ P
coherence of P “ px, y, zq on F requires that the following system is solvable
pSq P “
ř5
h“1 λhQh,
ř5
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 6,
or equivalently$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` λ4 “ xpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ4 ` λ5q,
λ1 ` λ2 “ ypλ1 ` λ2 ` λ4 ` λ5q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ4 ` λ5 “ tpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 5 ,
ðñ
$’’’&
’’’%
λ1 ` λ4 “ xt,
λ1 ` λ2 “ yt,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ4 ` λ5 “ t,
λ3 “ 1´ t,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 5 ,
(44)
that is $’’’’&
’’’’%
λ2 “ yt´ λ1,
λ3 “ 1´ t,
λ4 “ xt´ λ1,
λ5 “ t´ xt´ yt` λ1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 5 .
System pSq is solvable because tmaxt0, x`y´1u ď tmintx, yu, for every px, y, tq P
r0, 1s3 and the set of solutions S consists of the vectors Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λ5q such that$’’’&
’’’’%
tmaxt0, x` y ´ 1u ď λ1 ď tmintx, yu,
λ2 “ yt´ λ1,
λ3 “ 1´ t,
λ4 “ xt´ λ1,
λ5 “ t´ xt´ yt` λ1.
Moreover, for each Λ P S it holds that Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎB
“ λ1 ` λ2 `
λ4 ` λ5 “ t, and Φ3pΛq “
ř
h:ChĎA_B
λh “ 1. If t ą 0, it follows that, for each
Λ P S, Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq ą 0, and Φ3pΛq ą 0. Then, I0 “ H and by Theorem 2, the
assessment px, y, tq is coherent. If t “ 0, it follows that for each Λ P S, Φ1pΛq “
Φ2pΛq “ 0. Then, I0 “ t1, 2u and as it is well known that the sub-assessment px, yq
on pC|B,A|Bq is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s2, it follows by Theorem 2 that
px, y, tq is coherent. Then, px, y, tq is coherent for every px, y, tq P r0, 1s3. ˝
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The next theorem presents the coherent probability propagation rules in
Figure III under the conditional event existential import assumption.
Theorem 9 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and px, y, tq P r0, 1s3
be a (coherent) assessment on the family pC|B,A|B,B|pA _ Bqq. Then, the
extension z “ ppC|Aq is coherent if and only if z P rz1, z2s, where
z1 “
$&
%
0, if tpx` y ´ 1q ď 0,
tpx` y ´ 1q
1´ tp1´ yq
, if tpx` y ´ 1q ą 0,
z2 “
$&
%
1, if tpy ´ xq ď 0,
1´
tpy ´ xq
1´ tp1´ yq
, if tpy ´ xq ą 0.
Proof. In order to compute the lower and upper probability bounds z1 and z2 on
the further event C|A (i.e., the conclusion), we apply Algorithm 1 in a symbolic
way.
Computation of the lower probability bound z1 on C|A.
Input. The assessment px, y, tq on F “ pC|B,A|B,B|pA _Bqq and the event C|A.
Step 0. The constituents associated with pC|B,A|B,B|pA _ Bq, C|Aq are C0 “sA sB, C1 “ ABC, C2 “ A sBC, C3 “ AB sC, C4 “ A sB sC, C5 “ sABC, C6 “ sAB sC.
We observe thatH0 “ A_B; then, the constituents contained in H0 are C1, . . . , C6.
We construct the starting system with the unknowns λ1, . . . , λ6, z:$’’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 ` λ2 “ zpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ3 “ ypλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ tp
ř6
i“1 λiq,ř6
i“1 λi “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
ðñ
$’’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 ` λ2 “ zpλ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4q,
λ1 ` λ5 “ xt,
λ1 ` λ3 “ yt,
λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ t,ř6
i“1 λi “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(45)
Step 1. By setting z “ 0 in System (45), we obtain$’’&
’’%
λ1 ` λ2 “ 0, λ3 “ yt, λ5 “ xt,
λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ t,
λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
ðñ
$’’&
’’%
λ1 “ λ2 “ 0,
λ3 “ yt, λ4 “ 1´ t, λ5 “ xt,
λ6 “ tp1´ x´ yq,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(46)
As px, y, tq P r0, 1s3, the conditions λh ě 0, h “ 1, . . . , 5, in System (46) are all
satisfied. Then, System (46), i.e. System (45) with z “ 0, is solvable if and only if
λ6 “ tp1´ x´ yq ě 0. We distinguish two cases: piq tp1´ x´ yq ă 0 (i.e. t ą 0 and
x` y ą 1); piiq tp1 ´ x ´ yq ě 0, (i.e. t “ 0 or pt ą 0q ^ px ` y ď 1q). In Case piq,
System (46) is not solvable and we go to Step 2 of the algorithm. In Case piiq,
System (46) is solvable and we go to Step 3.
Case piq. By Step 2 we have the following linear programming problem:
Compute γ1 “ minp
ř
i:CiĎAC
λrq “ minpλ1 ` λ2q subject to:$&
%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xpλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q, λ1 ` λ3 “ ypλ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ tp
ř6
i“1 λiq, λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6.
(47)
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We notice that y is positive since x ` y ą 1 (and px, y, tq P r0, 1s3). Then, also
1´ tp1 ´ yq is positive and the constraints in (47) can be rewritten as$’’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 ` λ5 “ xtp1` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ3 “ ytp1` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ5 ` λ6 “ pt´ ytqp1 ` λ5 ` λ6q,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6,
ðñ
$’’’’’&
’’’’’%
λ5 ` λ6 “
tp1´yq
1´tp1´yq ,
λ1 ` λ5 “ xtp1 `
tp1´yq
1´tp1´yq q “
xt
1´tp1´yq ,
λ1 ` λ3 “ ytp1`
tp1´yq
1´tp1´yq q “
yt
1´tp1´yq ,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6,
ðñ
$’&
’%
maxt0, tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq u ď λ1 ď mintx, yu
t
1´tp1´yq ,
0 ď λ2 ď
1´t
1´tp1´yq , λ3 “
yt
1´tp1´yq ´ λ1, λ4 “
1´t
1´tp1´yq ´ λ2,
λ5 “
xt
1´tp1´yq ´ λ1, λ6 “
tp1´x´yq
1´tp1´yq ` λ1.
(48)
Thus, by recalling that x` y´1 ą 0, the minimum γ1 of λ1`λ2 subject to (47), or
equivalently subject to (48), is obtained at pλ11, λ
1
2q “ p
tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq , 0q. The procedure
stops yielding as output z1 “ γ1 “ λ11 ` λ
1
2 “
tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq .
Case piiq. We take Step 3 of the algorithm. We denote by Λ and S the vector
of unknowns pλ1, . . . , λ6q and the set of solutions of System (46), respectively. We
consider the following linear functions (associated with the conditioning events
H1 “ H2 “ B,H3 “ A_B,H4 “ A) and their maxima in S:
Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎB
λr “ λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6,
Φ3pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎA_B
λr “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6,
Φ4pΛq “
ř
r:CrĎA
λr “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4, Mi “ maxΛPS ΦipΛq, i “ 1, 2, 3, 4 .
(49)
By (46) we obtain: Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “ 0 ` yt ` xt ` t ´ xt ´ yt “ t, Φ3pΛq “ 1,
Φ4pΛq “ yt ` 1 ´ t “ 1 ´ tp1 ´ yq, @Λ P S. Then, M1 “ M2 “ t, M3 “ 1,
and M4 “ 1 ´ p1 ´ yqt. We consider two subcases: t ă 1; t “ 1. If t ă 1, then
M4 “ yt ` 1 ´ t ą yt ě 0; so that M4 ą 0 and we are in the first case of Step 3
(i.e., Mn`1 ą 0). Thus, the procedure stops and yields z
1 “ 0 as output. If t “ 1,
then M1 “M2 “M3 “ 1 ą 0 and M4 “ y. Hence, we are in the first case of Step 3
(when y ą 0) or in the second case of Step 3 (when y “ 0). Thus, the procedure
stops and yields z1 “ 0 as output.
Computation of the upper probability bound z2 on C|A. Input and Step
0 are the same as in the proof of z1. Step 1. By setting z “ 1 in System (45), we
obtain"
λ1 ` λ2 “ λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4, λ1 ` λ5 “ xt, λ1 ` λ3 “ yt,
λ1 ` λ3 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ t, λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1, λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ,
or equivalently$’’&
’’%
λ3 “ λ4 “ 0, λ1 ` λ5 “ xt,
λ1 “ yt, λ1 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ t,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ5 ` λ6 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 ;
ðñ
$&
%
λ1 “ yt, λ2 “ 1´ t, λ3 “ λ4 “ 0,
λ5 “ px ´ yqt, λ6 “ tp1´ xq,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 6 .
(50)
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As px, y, tq P r0, 1s3, the inequalities λh ě 0, h “ 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 are satisfied. Then,
System (50), i.e. System (45) with z “ 1, is solvable if and only if λ5 “ px´yqt ě 0.
We distinguish two cases: piq px ´ yqt ă 0, i.e. x ă y and t ą 0; piiq px ´ yqt ě 0,
i.e. x ě y or t “ 0. In Case piq, System (50) is not solvable and we go to Step 2 of
the algorithm. In Case piiq, System (50) is solvable and we go to Step 3.
Case piq. By Step 2 we have the following linear programming problem:
Compute γ2 “ maxpλ1 ` λ2q subject to the constraints in (47). As px, y, tq P r0, 1s
3
and x ă y, it follows that mintx, yu “ x and y ą 0. Then, in this case the
quantity 1 ´ tp1 ´ yq is positive and the constraints in (47) can be rewritten
as in (48). Thus, the maximum γ2 of λ1 ` λ2 subject to (48), is obtained
at pλ21, λ
2
2q “ p
xt
1´tp1´yq ,
1´t
1´tp1´yq q. The procedure stops yielding as output
z2 “ γ2 “ λ21 ` λ
2
2 “
xt
1´tp1´yq `
1´t
1´tp1´yq “
1´t`xt
1´t`yt “ 1´
tpy´xq
1´t`yt .
Case piiq. We take Step 3 of the algorithm. We denote by Λ and S the vector
of unknowns pλ1, . . . , λ6q and the set of solutions of System (50), respectively. We
consider the functions ΦipΛq and the maxima Mi, i “ 1, 2, 3, 4, given in (49).
From System (50), we observe that the functions Φ1, . . . ,Φ4 are constant for every
Λ P S, in particular it holds that Φ1pΛq “ Φ2pΛq “ t, Φ3pΛq “ 1 and Φ4pΛq “
yt` 1 ´ t ` 0 ` 0 “ 1 ´ tp1 ´ yq for every Λ P S. So that M1 “ M2 “ t, M3 “ 1,
and M4 “ 1´ tp1 ´ yq. We consider two subcases: t ă 1; t “ 1.
If t ă 1, then M4 “ yt` 1´ t ą yt ě 0; so that M4 ą 0 and we are in the first case
of Step 3 (i.e., Mn`1 ą 0). Thus, the procedure stops and yields z
2 “ 1 as output.
If t “ 1, then M1 “M2 “M3 “ 1 ą 0 and M4 “ y. Hence, we are in the first case
of Step 3 (when y ą 0) or in the second case of Step 3 (when y “ 0). Thus, the
procedure stops and yields z2 “ 1 as output. ˝
Remark 6.18. From Theorem 9, we obtain z1 ą 0 if and only if tpx` y´1q ą 0.
Moreover, we obtain z2 ă 1 if and only if tpy´xq ą 0. Moreover, it is easy to verify
that
z1tx,y,tu ` z
2
t1´x,y,tu “ 1,
where z1tx,y,tu and z
2
t1´x,y,tu are the lower bound and the upper bound of the two
assessments px, y, zq and p1´ x, y, zq on ppC|Bq, pA|Bq, B|pA _Bqq, respectively.
Based on Theorem 9, the next result presents the set of coherent extensions of a
given interval-valued probability assessment I “ prx1, x2s ˆ ry1, y2s ˆ rt1, t2sq Ď
r0, 1s3 on pC|B,A|B,B|pA _Bqq to the further conditional event C|A.
Theorem 10 Let A,B,C be three logically independent events and I “ prx1, x2sˆ
ry1, y2s ˆ rt1, t2sq Ď r0, 1s
3 be an imprecise assessment on pC|B,A|B,B|pA _ Bqq.
Then, the set Σ of the coherent extensions of I on C|A is the interval rz˚, z˚˚s,
where
z˚ “
$&
%
0, if t1px1 ` y1 ´ 1q ď 0,
t1px1 ` y1 ´ 1q
1´ t1p1 ´ y1q
, if t1px1 ` y1 ´ 1q ą 0, and
z˚˚ “
$&
%
1, if t1py1 ´ x2q ď 0,
1´
t1py1 ´ x2q
1´ t1p1´ y1q
, if t1py1 ´ x2q ą 0.
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Proof. Since the set r0, 1s3 on pC|B,A|B,B|pA _ Bqq is totally coherent
(Proposition 6), it follows that I is also totally coherent. For every precise
assessment P “ px, y, tq P I, we denote by rz1
P
, z2
P
s the interval of the coherent
extension of P on C|A, where z1
P
and z2
P
coincide with z1 and z2, respectively, as
defined in Theorem 9. Then, Σ “
Ť
PPIrz
1
P
, z2
P
s “ rz˚, z˚˚s, where z˚ “ infPPI z
1
P
and z˚˚ “ supPPI z
2
P
.
Concerning the computation of z˚ we distinguish the following alternative cases:
piq t1px1 ` y1 ´ 1q ď 0; piiq t1px1 ` y1 ą 1q ą 0. Case piq. By Theorem 9 it holds
that z1
P
“ 0 for P “ px1, y1, t1q. Thus, tz
1
P
: P P Iu Ě t0u and hence z˚ “ 0.
Case piiq. We note that the function tpx ` y ´ 1q : r0, 1s3 is nondecreasing in the
arguments x, y, t. Then, tpx ` y ´ 1q ě t1px1 ` y1 ´ 1q ą 0 for every px, y, tq P I.
Hence by Theorem 9, z1
P
“ tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq for every P P I. Moreover, the function
tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq is nondecreasing in the arguments x, y, t over the restricted domain I; then,
tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq ě
t1px1`y1´1q
1´t1p1´y1q
. Thus, z˚ “ inftz1
P
: P P Iu “ inf
!
tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq : px, y, zq P
I
)
“ t1px1`y1´1q
1´t1p1´y1q
.
Concerning the computation of z˚˚ we distinguish the following alternative cases:
piq t1py1´x2q ď 0; piiq t1py1´x2q ą 0. Case piq. By Theorem 9 it holds that z
2
P
“ 1
for P “ px2, y1, t1q P I. Thus, tz
2
P
: P P Iu Ě t1u and hence z˚˚ “ 1.
Case piiq. We observe that tpy ´ xq ě t1py ´ xq ě t1py1 ´ xq ě t1py1 ´ x2q ą 0
for every px, y, tq P I. Then, the condition tpy ´ xq ą 0 is satisfied for every
P “ px, y, tq P I and hence by Theorem 9, z2
P
“ 1 ´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq for every
P P I. The function 1 ´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq is nondecreasing in the argument x and
it is nonincreasing in the arguments y, t over the restricted domain I. Thus,
1 ´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq ď 1 ´
tpy´x2q
1´tp1´yq ď 1 ´
t1py1´x2q
1´t1p1´y1q
for every px, y, tq P I. Then
z˚˚ “ suptz2
P
: P P Iu “ sup
!
1 ´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq : px, y, zq P I
)
“ 1 ´ t1py1´x2q
1´t1p1´y1q
.
˝
6.2. Traditionally Valid Syllogisms of Figure III. In this section we
consider the probabilistic interpretation of the traditionally valid syllogisms of
Figure III (Datisi, Darapti, Ferison, Felapton, Disamis, Bocardo; see Table 1).
Like in Figure I and in Figure II, all syllogisms of Figure III without existential
import assumptions are probabilistically non-informative. Indeed, by instantiating
S, M , P for A, B, C, respectively, in Proposition 5, we observe that the imprecise
assessment r0, 1s3 on pP |M,S|M,P |Sq is t-coherent. Thus, for instance, from the
premises ppP |Mq “ 1 and ppS|Mq ą 0 infer that every ppP |Sq P r0, 1s is coherent.
This means that Datisi (“Every M is P , Some M is S, therefore Some S is P”)
without existential import assumption is not valid. Therefore we add the conditional
event existential import assumption: ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0 (see Definition 3.11.). In
what follows, we construct (s-)valid versions of the traditionally valid syllogisms of
Figure III, by suitable instantiations in Theorem 9.
Datisi. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with x “ 1, any y ą 0,
and any t ą 0, as tpx`y´1q “ ty ą 0, it follows that z1 “ tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq “
ty
1´tp1´yq ą 0.
Concerning the upper bound z2, as tpy ´ xq “ tpy ´ 1q ď 0, it holds that z2 “ 1.
Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment t1u ˆ
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p0, 1sˆp0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS_Mqq is Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt1uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sur
ty
1´tp1´yq , 1s.
We now prove that Σ “ p0, 1s. Of course, Σ Ď r0, 1s. Moreover, as for py, tq P
p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s it holds that ty
1´tp1´yq ą 0, then 0 R Σ and hence Σ Ď p0, 1s. Vice
versa, let z P p0, 1s. By choosing any pair py, tq P p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s such that 0 ă t ď z
and y “ 1, we obtain
ty
1´ tp1 ´ yq
“ t ď z ď 1,
which implies that z P Σ. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on P |S. (51)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (51) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppS|Mq ą 0, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq ą 0 , (52)
which is a s-valid version of Datisi. Therefore, inference (52) is a probabilistically
informative version of Datisi.
Darapti. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with x “ 1, any
y “ 1, and any t ą 0, as tpx` y´ 1q “ t ą 0, it follows that z1 “ tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq “ t ą 0.
Concerning the upper bound z2, as tpy ´ xq “ 0, it holds that z2 “ 1. Then, the
set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment t1u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s
on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq is Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt1uˆt1uˆp0,1surt, 1s “
Ť
ttPp0,1surt, 1s “
p0, 1s. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t1u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on P |S. (53)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (53) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppS|Mq “ 1, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq ą 0 , (54)
which is a s-valid version of Darapti.
Ferison. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with x “ 0, any y ą 0,
and any t ą 0, as tpx` y´ 1q “ tpy´ 1q ď 0, it follows that z1 “ 0. Concerning the
upper bound z2, as tpy´xq “ ty ą 0, it holds that z2 “ 1´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq “ 1´
ty
1´tp1´yq .
Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment
t0uˆp0, 1sˆp0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS_Mqq is Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt0uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sur0, 1´
ty
1´tp1´yq s. Equivalently, as pp
sP |Sq “ 1 ´ ppP |Sq, the set of coherent extensions
on sP |S, denoted by sΣ, of the imprecise assessment t0u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on
pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq is sΣ “ Ťtpx,y,tqPt0uˆp0,1sˆp0,1sur ty1´tp1´yq , 1s “ p0, 1s (see
Darapti). Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ p0, 1s ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on sP |S. (55)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (55) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppS|Mq ą 0, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 , (56)
which is a s-valid version of Ferison.
Felapton. By instantiating S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with x “ 0, any
y “ 1, and any t ą 0, as tpx ` y ´ 1q “ 0, it follows that z1 “ 0. Concerning the
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upper bound z2, as tpy´xq “ t ą 0, it holds that z2 “ 1´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq “ 1´t. Then, the
set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment t0u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s
on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _ Mqq is Σ “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt0uˆt1uˆp0,1sur0, 1 ´ ts. Equivalently,
the set sΣ of coherent extensions on sP |S is sΣ “ Ťtpx,y,tqPt0uˆt1uˆp0,1surt, 1s “Ť
ttPp0,1surt, 1s “ p0, 1s. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
t0u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on sP |S. (57)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (57) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq “ 0, ppS|Mq “ 1, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 , (58)
which is a s-valid version of Felapton.
Disamis. We instantiate S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with any x ą 0, y “ 1,
and any t ą 0. We observe that the imprecise assessment I “ p0, 1sˆt1uˆp0, 1s on
pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq coincides with I 1 Y I2, where I 1 “ t1u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s and
I2 “ p0, 1q ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s (notice that here p0, 1q denotes the open unit interval).
Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment I on P |S
coincides with Σ1YΣ2, where Σ1 and Σ2 are the sets of coherent extensions of the two
assessments I 1 and I2, respectively. In case of I 1 (which implies x “ 1), it holds that
Σ1 “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt1uˆt1uˆp0,1surt, 1s “ p0, 1s (see Darapti). In case of I
2 (which implies
x ą 0), as tpx` y ´ 1q “ tx ą 0, it follows that z1 “ tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq “ tx ą 0; concerning
the upper bound, as tpy ´ xq “ tp1 ´ xq ą 0, it holds that z2 “ 1 ´ tpy´xq
1´tp1´yq “
1 ´ tp1 ´ xq. Then, Σ2 “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPtp0,1qˆt1uˆp0,1surtx, 1 ´ tp1´ xqs “ p0, 1q. Hence,
Σ “ Σ1 Y Σ2 “ p0, 1s. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
p0, 1s ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs p0, 1s on P |S. (59)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (59) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq ą 0, ppS|Mq “ 1, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq ą 0 , (60)
which is a s-valid version of Disamis (“Some M is P , Every M is S, therefore Some
S is P”).
Bocardo. We instantiate S,M,P in Theorem 9 for A,B,C with any x ă 1, y “ 1,
and any t ą 0. We observe that the imprecise assessment I “ r0, 1qˆt1uˆp0, 1s on
pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq coincides with I 1 Y I2, where I 1 “ t0u ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s and
I2 “ p0, 1q ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s (notice that here p0, 1q denotes the open unit interval).
Then, the set Σ of coherent extensions on P |S of the imprecise assessment I on
P |S coincides with Σ1 YΣ2, where Σ1 and Σ2 are the sets of coherent extensions of
the two assessments I 1 and I2, respectively. In case of I 1 (which implies x “ 0), it
holds that Σ1 “
Ť
tpx,y,tqPt0uˆt1uˆp0,1sur0, 1´ ts “ r0, 1q (see the set Σ in Felapton).
In case of I2 (which implies 0 ă x ă 1), it holds that Σ2 “ p0, 1q (see the set Σ2 in
Disamis). Hence, Σ “ Σ1 Y Σ2 “ r0, 1q. Thus, by Definition 3.8.,
r0, 1q ˆ t1u ˆ p0, 1s on pP |M,S|M,M |pS _Mqq |ùs r0, 1q on P |S. (61)
In terms of probabilistic constraints, (61) can be expressed by
pppP |Mq ă 1, ppS|Mq “ 1, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs ppP |Sq ă 1 ,
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which is equivalent to
ppp sP |Mq ą 0, ppS|Mq “ 1, ppM |pS _Mqq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ą 0 . (62)
Formula (62) is a s-valid version of Bocardo (“Some M is not P , Every M is S,
therefore Some S is not P”).
Remark 6.19. We observe that, traditionally, the conclusions of logically valid
Aristotelian syllogisms of Figure III are neither in the form of sentence type A
( every) nor of E (no). In terms of our probability semantics, we study which
assessments px, y, tq on pP |M,S|M,S|pS_Mqq propagate to z1 “ z2 “ ppP |Sq “ 1
in order to validate A in the conclusion. According to Theorem 9, px, y, tq P r0, 1s3
propagates to z1 “ z2 “ 1 if and only if$’’’&
’’’%
px, y, tq P r0, 1s3,
tpx` y ´ 1q ą 0,
z1 “ tpx`y´1q
1´tp1´yq “ 1,
tpy ´ xq ď 0,
ðñ
$&
%
px, y, tq P r0, 1s3,
1` yt´ t ą 0,
tx “ 1, ty ď 1,
ðñ
$&
%
x “ 1,
0 ă y ď 1,
t “ 1.
Then, z1 “ z2 “ 1 if and only if px, y, tq “ p1, y, 1q, with 0 ă y ď 1. However,
for the syllogisms it would be too strong to require t “ 1 as an existential import
assumption, we only require that t ą 0. Similarly, in order to validate E in the
conclusion, it can be shown that assessments px, y, tq on pP |M,S|M,S|pS _Mqq
propagate to the conclusion z1 “ z2 “ ppP |Sq “ 0 if and only if px, y, tq “ p0, y, 1q,
with 0 ă y ď 1. Therefore, if t is just positive neither A nor E can be validate
within in our probability semantics of Figure III.
§7. Applications to Nonmonotonic Reasoning. We recall that the default
H |∼ E denotes the sentence “E is a plausible consequence of H” (see, e.g.,
Kraus et al., 1990). Moreover, the negated default H |∼{ E denotes the sentence “it
is not the case, that: E is a plausible consequence of H”. Based on Definition 8 in
Gilio et al. (2016), we interpret the default H |∼ E by the probability assessment
ppE|Hq “ 1; while the negated default H |∼{ E is interpreted by the imprecise
probability assessment ppE|Hq ă 1. Thus, as the probability assessment ppE|Hq ą
0 is equivalent to pp sE|Hq ă 1, the negated default H |∼{ sE is also interpreted
by ppE|Hq ą 0. Then, the basic syllogistic sentence types (see Table 2) can be
interpreted in terms of defaults or negated defaults as follows:
(A) S |∼ P (Every S is P , ppP |Sq “ 1);
(E) S |∼ sP (No S is P , pp sP |Sq “ 1);
(I) S |∼{ sP (Some S is P , ppP |Sq ą 0);
(O) S |∼{ P (Some S is not P , pp sP |Sq ą 0).
For example, recall the probabilistic modus Barbara (12), which is strictly valid
and thus valid, can be expressed in terms of defaults and negated defaults as
follows: pM |∼ P, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ù S |∼ P . As pointed out in Gilio et al.
(2016) the default version of Barbara is equivalent to the well-known inference rule
Weak Transitivity, which is valid in the nonmonotonic System P` (i.e., System
P plus Rational Monotonicity; see Kraus et al., 1990) as shown in Theorem 2.1
in Freund et al. (1991). We present the default versions of the (logically valid)
syllogisms of Figures I, II, and III in Table 8. These versions, which involve defaults
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and negated defaults, are valid in our approach and can serve as inference rules for
nonmonotonic reasoning.
Moreover, we observe that some syllogisms can be expressed in defaults only
without using negated defaults. For example, if the conditional event existential
import of Barbara is strengthened by ppS|pS _Mqq “ 1, we obtain the following
default version of Barbara:
pM |∼ P, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼ Sq |ùs S |∼ P. (63)
Note that inference (63) still corresponds to AAA of Figure I. In probabilistic terms
inference (63) means that the premises p-entails the conclusion (see Section 10.2 in
Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2019), i.e.,
pppP |Mq “ 1, ppM |Sq “ 1, ppS|pS _Mqq “ 1q |ùs ppP |Sq “ 1. (64)
The procedure of replacing negated defaults by defaults, for obtaining inference
(63), can also yield new syllogisms. For example, AAA of Figure III can be obtained
from Darapti:
pM |∼ P,M |∼ S, pS _Mq |∼ Mq |ùs S |∼ P. (65)
Equations (63) and (65) are p-valid inference rules for nonmonotonic reasoning and
constitute syllogisms which are beyond traditional Aristotelian syllogisms (since,
traditionally, AAA does not describe a valid syllogism of Figure III).
§8. Generalized Quantifiers. The basic syllogistic sentence types A, E, I, O
involve quantifiers which we represent by special cases of probability evaluations,
namely equal to 1 or 0 for the universal quantifiers, and excluding 0 or 1
for the particular quantifiers. A natural generalization of such quantifiers is
to use thresholds between 0 and 1. Then, we obtain generalized quantifiers
(Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Peters & Westerst˚ahl, 2006). For instance, the statement
At least most S are P can be interpreted by the conditional probability assessment
ppP |Sq ě x, where x denotes a suitable threshold (e.g., greater than 0.5). The choice
of the threshold depends on the context of the speaker. By using such sentences, we
can construct and check the validity of syllogisms involving generalize quantifiers.
Consider for instance the following generalization of Baroco (or of Camestres):
All P are M .
At least most S are not-M .
Therefore, At least most S are not-P .
In this syllogism, the first premise is of the sentence type A but the second
premise and the conclusion consist of generalized quantified statements. In our
semantics this syllogism is interpreted as follows: from the premises ppM |P q “ 1 and
ppĎM |Sq ě y and the conditional event existential import assumption ppS|pS_P qq ą
0 infer the conclusion pp sP |Sq ě y, where y ą 0.5. To prove the validity of this
syllogism instantiate S,M,P in Theorem 8 for A,B,C with x1 “ x2 “ 1, y1 “ y,
y2 “ 1, t1 ą 0, and t2 “ 1. Then, we obtain z
˚ “ y1 “ y and z
˚˚ “ 1. Therefore, the
set Σ of coherent extensions on sP |S of the imprecise assessment t1uˆ ry, 1s ˆ p0, 1s
on pM |P,ĎM |S, S|pS _ P qq is Σ “ ry, 1s. By Definition 3.8.,
pppM |P q “ 1, ppĎM |Sq ě y, ppS|pS _ P qq ą 0q |ùs pp sP |Sq ě y . (66)
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Figure I
AAA Barbara pM |∼ P, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼ P.
AAI Barbari pM |∼ P, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ù S |∼{ sP .
AII Darii pM |∼ P, S |∼{ ĎM, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼{ sP .
EAE Celarent pM |∼ sP, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼ sP .
EAO Celaront pM |∼ sP, S |∼ M, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ù S |∼{ P.
EIO Ferio pM |∼ sP, S |∼{ ĎM, pS _Mq |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼{ P.
Figure II
AEE Camestres pP |∼ M,S |∼ ĎM, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼ sP .
AEO Camestrop pP |∼ M,S |∼ ĎM, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ù S |∼{ P.
AOO Baroco pP |∼ M,S |∼{ M, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼{ P.
EAE Cesare pP |∼ ĎM,S |∼ M, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼ sP .
EAO Cesaro pP |∼ ĎM,S |∼ M, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ù S |∼{ P.
EIO Festino pP |∼ ĎM,S |∼{ ĎM, pS _ P q |∼{ sSq |ùs S |∼{ P.
Figure III
AII Datisi pM |∼ P,M |∼{ sS, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ sP .
AAI Darapti pM |∼ P,M |∼ S, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ sP .
EIO Ferison pM |∼ sP,M |∼{ sS, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ P.
EAO Felapton pM |∼ sP,M |∼ S, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ P.
IAI Disamis pM |∼{ sP ,M |∼ S, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ sP .
OAO Bocardo pM |∼{ P,M |∼ S, pS _Mq |∼{ ĎMq |ùs S |∼{ P.
Table 8: Traditional (logically valid) Aristotelian syllogisms of Figure I, II, and III
(see Table 1) in terms of defaults and negated defaults, under the conditional event
existential import assumption.
Equation (66) is an extension of Baroco (38) to generalized quantifiers.
By applying the probability propagation rules (for precise or interval-valued
probability assessments) of Figures I, II, and III syllogisms with generalized
quantifiers can be obtained.
§9. Concluding Remarks. In this paper we presented a probabilistic
interpretation of the basic syllogistic sentence types (A, E, I, O) and suitable
existential import assumptions in terms of probabilistic constraints. By exploiting
coherence, we introduced the notion of validity and strict validity for probabilistic
inferences involving imprecise probability assessments.
For each Figure I, II, and III, we verified the coherence of any probability
assessment in r0, 1s3 on the three conditional events which are involved in the
major and the minor premise and the conclusion. These results show that, without
existential import assumption, all traditionally valid syllogisms are probabilistically
non-informative. We also verified for all three figures the total coherence of the
imprecise assessment r0, 1s3 on the conditional events in the premise set including
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the existential import. Then, we derived the interval of all coherent extensions on
the conclusion for every coherent (precise or interval-valued) probability assessment
on the premise set for each of the three figures. These results were then exploited
to prove the validity or strict validity of our probabilistic interpretation of all
traditionally valid syllogisms of the three figures: Barbara, Barbari, Darii, Celarent,
Celaront, and Ferio of Figure I; Camestres, Camestrop, Baroco, Cesare, Cesaro, and
Festino of Figure II; Datisi, Darapti, Ferison, Felapton, Disamis, and Bocardo of
Figure III. As mentioned before the coherence approach is more general compared
to the standard approaches where the conditional probability ppE|Hq is defined
by ppE ^ Hq{ppHq, where ppHq must be positive. Indeed, we showed that the
conditional event existential import assumption (which is sufficient for validity)
is weaker than the requirement of positive conditioning events for the conditional
events involved in the syllogisms.
We then built a knowledge bridge from our probability semantics of the
Aristotelian syllogisms to nonmonotonic reasoning by interpreting the basic
syllogistic sentence types by suitable defaults and negated defaults. We also showed
how some new valid syllogisms can be obtained by strengthening our existential
import assumption. Moreover, by this procedure, the traditionally not valid AAA
of Figure III can be validated. These new syllogisms, which are expressed in terms
of defaults only, are p-valid inference rules which we propose, together with default
versions of the traditional ones for future research in nonmotononic reasoning.
Finally, we showed that the proposed semantics can be used to analyze syllogisms
involving generalized quantifiers. Specifically, sentence like at least most S are P
can be interpreted by imprecise probability assessments.
We presented a general method to validate probabilistically non-informative
inferences by adding additional premises. These additional premises can
be existential import assumptions, (negated) defaults or other probabilistic
constraints. These methods can be used to solve inference problems in general with
applications in various disciplines. For instance, our probabilistic interpretation of
Aristotelian syllogisms can serve as new rationality framework for the psychology of
reasoning, which has a long tradition of using syllogistics for assessing the rationality
of human inference. Moreover, our results on generalized quantifiers can be
applied for investigating semantic and pragmatic problems involving quantification
in linguistics. Furthermore, our knowledge bridges to nonmonotonic reasoning
show the applicability of the proposed approach in reasoning under uncertainty,
knowledge representation and artificial intelligence. This selection of applications
points to new knowledge bridges among our semantics, Aristotelian syllogistics, and
various disciplines.
We will devote future work to apply our semantics to nonmonotonic reasoning and
its relation to probability logic. Specifically, we will investigate the validity of our
default versions of the syllogisms in the light of different systems of nonmonotonic
reasoning.
Future work will also be devoted to the full probabilistic analysis of Figure
IV. Indeed, categorical syllogisms of Figure IV go beyond the scope of this
paper for two reasons. Firstly, they were introduced after Aristotle’s Analytica
Priora and are therefore not considered as (proper) Aristotelian syllogisms.
Secondly, in contrast to the first three figures, there is not a unique conditional
event existential import assumption for validating syllogisms of Figure IV
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(Pfeifer & Sanfilippo, working paper). Therefore, several probability propagation
rules should be developed only for this figure, which cannot be done in this paper
owing to lack of space.
Finally, another strand of future research will focus on further generalizations of
Aristotelian syllogisms by applying the theory of compounds of conditionals under
coherence (see, e.g. Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014, 2019). While, in the present paper,
we connected the syllogistic terms S and P in the basic syllogistic sentence types
by conditional events P |S, this theory of compounds of conditionals allows for
obtaining generalized syllogistic sentence types like If S1 are P1, then S2 are P2
(i.e., pP2|S2q|pP1|S1q) by suitable nestings of conditional events. Interestingly, in
the context of conditional syllogisms, the resulting uncertainty propagation rules
coincide with the respective non-nested versions (see, e.g., Sanfilippo et al., 2017,
2018, 2020). Future research is needed to investigate whether similar results can be
obtained in the context of such generalized Aristotelian syllogisms.
The various possibilities for applications and generalizations of Aristotelian
syllogisms call for future research and highlight the impressive research impact
of Aristotle’s original work.
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